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This thesis analyzes the defense policy of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense 
Force (JMSDF) in the early 21st century. The primary research question is 
"Should the defense force structure of the JMSDF in the early 21st century remain 
the same as it has been in the last 10 years?" To answer this question, I made a 
brief analysis of current and future prospects for Japan and her neighboring 
countries in terms of their politics, diplomacy, economy and military. These 
countries included China, North and South Korea, Russia and the U.S. Finally, 
I evaluated the cost of baseline and alternative force structure. 
The alternative force structure may require some revision of current legal 
limitations and increased defense expenditures. Japan, however, should undertake 
this correction not only for her own security needs, but also to make a more 
equitable contribution to ensure the Japan-U.S. security arrangement viable in the 
coming decade. 
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The East-West confrontation that has keynoted the world 
military situation since the end of World War II, has come to an end 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The structure of two military 
powers - the United States and the Soviet Union - confronting each 
other with enormous military forces, including nuclear weapons, has 
collapsed. Military structures were built on the assumption of balance 
of nuclear forces between the United State and Soviet Union and the 
associated confrontation between the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO). Now, 
there are movements towards wide-spread arms control and weapon 
reductions. As the international community is searching for a new 
world order of peace and security, these movements reduce the 
possibility of a world scale war breaking out in the future, 
The end of the "Cold-War" has influenced each country in many 
aspects. Plans for reduction of the U.S. military has started. These 
changes are expected to influence the future role of Japan Maritime 
Self-Defense Force(JMSDF). 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the defense policy of 
JMSDF for the early 21st century. The primary research questions are 
: Should the force structure of JMSDF in the early 21st century remain 
the same as it has been during the last 10 years? What possible 
military situations do the countries in East Asia face, and how might 
they change in the future? What has been the trend of the military 
balance in the East Asia? What is the weakness of JMSDF? How do 
the answers to these questions affect the defense policy of JMSDF? 
C. FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH 
1. Outline 
There are seven parts included in this thesis. The first part 
provides background information and introduction to this research. 
The second part analyzes the country situation surrounding Japan. 
The third part analyzes the country situation of Japan itself.    The 
fourth part analyzes current features of JMSDF. The fifth part analyzes 
potential future situations for countries surrounding Japan. The sixth 
part examines an alternative force structure of JMSDF and the 
associated cost implication. The final part presents findings and 
conclusions. 
2. Methodology 
Data on JMSDF was collected from the Japan Maritime Staff 
Office in Tokyo. This data was used to conduct analysis as described in 
the third and fourth part of this thesis. Additional information from 
"Jane's Fighting Ships and Aircraft" and data from "The Military 
Balance 1993-1994" (The International Institute for Strategic Studies) 
were used in the second part. 
3. Scope 
The main thrust of this thesis is to examine what is the role of 
the JMSDF and what might it be in the early 21st century. 
The following areas will be examined in this thesis. 
- Japan's defense program 
- Defense policy of U.S., Russia, North and South Korea 
- Forecast of military strength of each country 
- Evaluation of JMSDF force structure 
- Cost of alternative force structure 
H. COUNTRY SITUATION AROUND JAPAN 
A UNITED STATES OP AMERICA 
The end of Cold War meant the elimination of "anti- 
communism." Anti-communism had aspects of fighting together 
against a common enemy and of defending freedom and democracy. 
These values were major elements that kept the unity of U.S. society 
after the WWII. As the result of the elimination of anti-communism, 
several confrontations and confusing situations have appeared on the 
surface as a lack of unity among politics, diplomacy, economy, and 
society. 
Although the "Containment Strategy" eventually triumphed, it 
was not without the cost of large expenditures. This certainly had an 
effect on changing the U.S. from a creditor nation to a debtor nation. 
For example, the policy of increased armaments expansion under the 
Reagan administration affected the trade deficit through linkage of 
twin deficits. 
1. Politics 
Elements relating to policy making include inputs from the 
President, Congress, the Staff of President, the Staff of Congress, 
lobbyists, political parties, and public opinion. These elements make 
up the complicated policy making process. Decentralization of power 
and a system of "checks and balances" has made the forecasting a 
nation's policy difficult. Initial impression of the Clinton 
administration and its economic may be summarized as follows1; 
The administration's economic policy announced in February, 
however, roused the nation's support. Clinton's economic plan calls for 
much greater burden on individuals than his campaign promises 
indicated. Although the plan calls for a wide range of tax increase 
despite promises of a tax cut for the middle classes, it raised the public's 
sense of crisis and succeeded in giving the impression that Clinton was 
serious about rebuilding America. 
1
 ASIAN SECURITY 1993-1994 (Research Institute For Peace and Security) p38 
2. Diplomacy 
Current U.S. diplomatic policy is based on the recognition that 
international cooperation is necessary to create the new world order. 
Behind this policy, there is a recognition that maintaining a leadership 
role contributes to the national interest of the U.S. in the long run. 
'Asian Security' says2; 
In a hearing before the Senate, Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher said that the Clinton administration's foreign policy will 
rest on three pillars: 1) the elevation of economic security to one of the 
main goals of foreign policy; 2) the maintenance of military forces 
sufficient to respond to new security threats; and 3) the encouragement of 
democratization and market economies. 
With respect to the relation with Japan, Masaru Tamamoto says 
as follows3; 
The U.S. public is extremely uncertain about the future. In stark 
contrast to the heady optimism that characterized the Reagan years, the 
population now seems fixated with pessimism, and that attitude 
translates into ambivalence with shades of hostility toward Japan. 
The U.S. -Japan relationship, firmly anchored since 1945, is in 
danger of going adrift. During the Cold war, U.S. interests in Japan were 
rooted in geostrategic calculation. Although geostrategy certainly was 
critically important, Japan's psychological attachment to the United 
States also played a crucial role. That bond has now outlived the Cold 
War. The leadership of both countries must now forge a new rationale 
accompanied by a new set of rules capable of underpinning a healthy 
relationship. But the United States is suspicious of Japan's intentions. 
The truth, however, is that Japanese behavior is largely dependent on 
U.S. behavior. U.S. policy, then, is crucially important because more 
than formulation of a new set of Japanese foreign policies is at stake. 
Japan is again engaged in the fundamental redefinition of its national 
identity. How the United States behaves will influence the 
transformation of Japan's national personality. 
3. Economy 
The restoration of a "Strong America" during the Reagan 
administration contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
however, it also contributed to the "Twin deficits" (the governmental 
deficit and the current account deficit in the trade areas). 
2
 ASIAN SECURITY 1993-1994 (Research Institute For Peace and Security) p39 
3
 Masaru Tamamoto, The Japan That Wants to Be Liked: Society and International 
Participation," in Danny Unger & Paul Blackburn (ed.), Japan's Emerging Global Role 
(INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF DIPLOMACY BOOK, 1993), p40-41 
Another aspect of economy was the deterioration of local 
financing. During the Reagan period, a competence was transferred 
from central government to the local government, but at the same 
time, local financing deteriorated because of reductions of government 
subsidies. This deterioration encouraged active courting of Japanese 
companies for investment by state and local governments. 
The third aspect is the trade policy between the two countries. 
Because of the dissatisfaction over the progress from international 
negotiations such as the Uruguay Round and the constant deficit in the 
U.S.-Japanese balance of trade, there was a strong support for bilateral 
or unilateral action to force the foreign market open. 
The final aspect was the establishment of NAFTA. This 
agreement has the possibility of expanding not only to Latin America, 
but to the Asian countries as well. 
Figure 1 shows the trend of the U.S. Gross National 
Product(GNP) during recent decade. 
Year 
Note: These charts are expressed in U.S. dollars, based on 1991 prices and using a 1991 deflator. 
Figure 1 
Trend in Gross National Product(GNP) 
From Figure 1, U.S.'s GNP had been increasing steadily until 
1990, but began to decrease by 1.2% in 1991 (see Appendix A). 
Figure 2 shows the trend in U.S.'s Military Expenditures and it 
indicates a slight decline since 1987 and large decline of 12.0% in 
1991 (see Appendix B). 











Note: These charts are expressed in U.S. dollars, based on 1991 prices and using a 1991 deflator. 
Figure 2 
Trend in Military Expenditures 
4. Military 
a. New Defense Strategy* 
The United States has made its defense strategy clear. It places 
priority on addressing, not Soviet threats but regional threats around 
the world in order to ensure the security of the U.S. as well as its allies. 
This strategy is supported by the following four pillars. 
- Maintenance of effective strategic deterrence 
- Maintenance of forward deployment force 
- Ability to respond to regional and local contingencies 
- Reconstitution of military forces 
These defense policies mean that the U.S. will try to 
prevent other countries from seeking supremacy and that the U.S. 
will not allow other countries to change the current world order 
which is lead by the U.S. 
4Defense   of  Japan   1992(Japan   Defense   Agency)pl7 
Figure 3 shows the trend of major naval forces during 
recent decade. From Figure 3, we can see that U.S. naval forces has 
been declining since 1989 (see Appendix C, D, P and Q). 
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Figure 3 
Trend of Major Naval Forces 
b. Military Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region 
The U.S. remains as an Asia-Pacific power with national 
interests in East Asia. The U.S. Department of Defense has stated, 
"Despite the decade of change that we foresee, our regional interests 
in Asia will remain similar to those we have pursued in the past. With 
a total two-way transpacific trade exceeding 300 billion dollars 
annually, 50 percent more than our transatlantic trade, it is in our own 
best interest to help preserve peace and stability. The principal 
elements of our Asian strategy - forward deployed forces, overseas 
bases, and bilateral security arrangements - will remain valid and 
essential to maintaining regional stability, deterring aggression, and 
preserving  U.S.   interest."5    U.S. interests in this region require a 
5
   A  Strategic  Framework for Asian Pacific  Rim;  Looking Toward the 21st 
Century   (Department  of Defense,   1990)   p8 
continuing commitment. Therefore forward presence forces in this 
region are essential to the U.S. Maritime Strategy. "Forward presence 
forces will be principally maritime. The U.S. plans to keep one 
Aircraft Carrier Battle Group and an Amphibious Ready Group home 
ported in Japan and has developed new forward options not 
dependent upon former bases in the Philippines."6 
However, 'Asian Security' says, "Despite U.S. assurances 
that the U.S. military would remain engaged in Asia, there is a growing 
concern in many countries of the region that cuts in the US defense 
budget, domestic difficulties and isolationist pressures many causes a 
larger and quicker departure of U.S. forces than expected."7 
Figure 4 shows the trend of the U.S.'s major naval forces in 
the Pacific. From Figure 4, we can see the reduction of naval forces in 
spite of the U.S.'s strategic presentation (see Appendix E, F P and Q). 





















Öl O i- 
00       en       en 







"150   - 
+ 100   E 





Fiscal   Year 
Figure 4 
Trend of Major Naval Forces 
6
   The   National  Military   Strategy  of the   United  States  (Chairman  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff) p22 
7
 ASIAN SECURITY 1993-1994 (Research Institute For Peace and Security) p56 
B. RUSSIA 
Russia has been in a transition period shifting from 
totalitarianism to democracy, socialism to capitalism, suppression to 
freedom. Although the dictatorship and national system of one party 
rule has collapsed, a new democratic system and the market economy 
system has not yet begun to function. Russian politics, economy and 
society has been thrown into a state of confusion. 
Despite Russia's touted democracy, so far, only small parts of 
democracy such as freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of 
conscience, and plural parties have actually materialized. It is known 
that economic revolution and democratization is more difficult than 
predicted, and "common illusions" of rapid changes and fast economic 
recovery seem to have collapsed. Under such conditions, the 
conservatives consisting of old Soviet Communist Party members, who 
had failed in the coup d'etat on August in 1991, seem to be making a 
come back while   criticizing President Yeltsin. 
1. Politics 
The success of the economic revolution that President Yeltsin 
has been forcing seems to be quite marginal. The major difficulty 
appears to be the lack of a strong administrative system that 
accomplishes the orders of the president. Although President Yeltsin 
has managed to maintain power, his influence in the supreme 
congress is very limited. Many of his frequent Presidential orders 
were not implemented because of the above mentioned weakness in 
the administrative system as well as conflicts with the congress. 
Although President Yeltsin won the confidence during the 
national referendum on April 25, 1993, his base of political power 
seems to be eroding. 
There is also the movement toward the federation in Russia and 
the decentralization of power.   'Asian Security' says8, 
8
 ASIAN SECURITY 1993-1994 (Research Institute For Peace and Security) p65~66 
By turning to the leaders of the republics and regions within the 
Russian Federation Yeltsin had gained powerful new allies. But this may 
also result in new centers of power away from Moscow that he will find it 
difficult to deal with in the future. 
2. Diplomacy 
Until recently, Russia has followed a diplomatic policy based on 
its military power. The Gorbachev government implemented the 
"New Thinking in Foreign Policy" as a new policy. This policy 
intended to achieve following objective9; 
(1) Build up of international environment of detente that enable 
the domestic economic revolution. (2) Attach greater importance to 
national interest of each country than ideology and class struggle. (3) 
Attach greater importance to common(mutual) defense than military 
expanding defense. (4) Approval of the existence of one world economy 
system. (5) Attach greater importance to the attitude that respect the 
whole world benefits common to each country than the framework of 
class struggle. 
Yeltsin upheld the idea of the "New Thinking in Foreign Policy" 
and engaged with other world leaders in this context. 
He said, "Russia aims the establishment of long range 
cooperation and alliance with the Eastern and Western developed 
countries." But on the other hand, he also said, "We must not lose the 
[Face of Great Russia] as the result of it."10 He has been emphasizing 
the necessity of constructing a new position in the world while 
defending the national interests of Russia. 
3. Economy 
The Russian economic revolution started under quite difficult 
conditions, and it was meant to be based on the following principles. 
(1) Free price 
(2) Attach importance to the policy of austerity in the field of 
budget and currency 
(3) "Open economy" and the attitude to acquire international 
loan. 
Since the Russian policy of "market economy" was based on 
Russian centralism, conflicts between the republics soon appeared. 
9
 Gendai Yougo no Kiso Tishiki (Jiyuu  Kokumin  Sya,   1992) 
10
 Speech at the  Supreme  Congress in   1992 
10 
The lack of basic principles of a market system such as contract 
negotiations, and confidence building within the former Soviet Union 
created confusion and conflicts between the regions. 
Yeltsin began the rapid liberalization of price in 1992 not for the 
purpose of economic rationality but for political reasons. The 
liberation of prices and the distribution of goods from centralized 
control did not stimulate production. Instead, it deepened the 
confusion of economy, making living standard of the nation worse. 
President Yeltsin has tried to avoid the influence of the military 
industrial complex. He attempted to shift into the market economy by 
rapid economic changes. His intention of making progress of 
economic revolution has been facing the difficulty.    'Asian Security' 
says11; 
Monetarist economic reforms to liberalize and stabilize the 
economy got under way in 1992. Yet because of their reliance on market 
mechanisms, which did not and still do not exist, the economy has not 
been responding as predicted. 
Economic liberalization involved the removal of prices controls 
on commodities and services, but not on basic foods, fuel or 
transportation fares, although bread prices went up 300% and gasoline 
500%. 
It also reports;12 
If Russia is beginning to see light at the end of the tunnel, the 
opening is still a long way off. The inflation rate is falling, but the more 
difficult drop is still ahead. Pushing greater reforms now will probably 
result in rapidly rising unemployment, while removing import subsidies 
and raising energy prices, which are both necessary if the economy is to 
be stabilized, will mean rising prices. 
Figure 5 shows the trend of the Russian GNP during recent 
decade.    The GNP increased until  1989, but started to decline in 
1990; increasing to 3.6% in 1990 and 8.5% in 1991(see Appendix A). 
1! ASIAN SECURITY 1993-1994 (Research Institute For Peace and Security) p67 
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Note: These charts are expressed in US. dollars, based on 1991 prices and using a 1991 deflator. 
Figure 5 
Trend in Gross National Product(GNP) 
Figure 6 shows the similar trend in Military Expenditures. It 
had increased steadily until 1988, but it started decrease in 1989; 















Note: These charts are expressed in U.S. dollars, based on 1991 prices and using a 1991 deflator. 
Figure 6 
Trend in Military Expenditures 
4. Military 
a. General Situation 
Russia, which is to take over a greater part of the former 
Soviet Union's forces, is in a transitional period. It faces a reduction of 
12 
military personnel to 1,500,000, a shift to professional forces, the 
creation of rapid deployment force and the establishment of new 
Russian forces. 
The Russian General Staff Office announced its new 
military doctrine on 3 June 1992. It has since been under 
deliberation of the Russian government and supreme congress. This 
doctrine was based on following principles. 
- Attitude to the war 
Eliminate war, use of arms, threat by arms as the means to 
achieve the political, economical purposes. Eliminate the preemptive 
use of nuclear and weapons of mass destruction. 
- Cause of the war 
If there is an invasion into the Russian territory, or military 
buildup near the Russian border by another country, Russia maintains 
the right to take necessary action in self defense. 
- Political purpose and means to an end 
Major purpose of the national security policy is based on the 
prevention of the war. In order to achieve this purpose, Russia will try 
to stop the expansion of arms, nuclear experimentation, as well as 
perform the step by step-reduction of arms to a minimum level. 
The Russian Federation National Defense Law was signed 
by President Yeltsin and came to effect on April 24, 1992. This law 
set the schedule of reduction of the Russian military. 'Asian Security' 
says, 13 
According to this plan, troop strength is to be reduced to 1.5 
million by thf end of the century. 
In the first phase (1992) the groundwork for future change was 
laid, as priority was given to the organizational and legal framework 
through the establishment for a defense ministry and other measures. 
The second stage of the defense program (1993-1995) aims at 
completing the withdrawal of forces from abroad, reorganizing military 
districts, the reorganization of rapid deployment forces and the 
introduction of a composite system of both conscripted and volunteer 
recruiting 
13
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In the third and final phase (to be completed by the year 2000) the 
five existing armies will be merged into one, recruiting will rely on 
volunteers and total troop numbers will fall to 1.5 million. 
Although the quantitative scale has also been reduced, 
qualitative modernization seems to have been continuing. As a whole, 
rationalization and modernization objectives seems to have been 
achieved. 
Figure 7 shows the trend of Russia's major naval force 
during recent decade. From Figure 7, we can see the significant 
quantitative reduction since 1990 (see Appendix G, H, P and Q). 
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Figure 7 
Trend of Russia's Major Naval Forces 
b. Far East Forces14 
Although the scale has been reduced, modernization has 
been continuing and the rate of reduction in the Far East is less than 
that observed in Europe. In the Far East region, Russian Ground, 
Naval, Air Forces deployed at the Maritime Province of Siberia, 
Sakhalin, the Sea of Okhotsk, Kamchatka Peninsula have been 
substantial and no other country except for the U.S. can equal that 
force (see Appendix Q). 
14
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(1) Ground Forces. Russian ground forces in the Far East 
region have been reduced in scale since 1990, and at present their 
strength totals 27 army divisions with approximately 240,000 
personnel. Part of the army divisions have recently been reorganized to 
machine-gun and artillery divisions, which are corps for their regional 
defense. In some of the reduced divisions, personnel is filled at less than 
5 percent of full-strength while equipment is almost 100 percent 
replenished. These divisions can be restored to a full-fledged ordinary 
division by returning personnel levels to fighting strength. 
In qualitative development, state-of-the-art T-80 tanks, 
first deployed in the Far East in 1990, continue to be sent to the region. 
Modernization also continues with the deployment of such equipment as 
armored infantry combat vehicles, multiple-launch rockets, heavy 
artillery and armored helicopters. 
(2) Naval Forces. The Pacific Fleet, the largest of the 
former Soviet Union's four naval fleets, is primarily based in 
Vladivostok. The Pacific Fleet comprises approximately 745 ships with 
total displacement of about 1,890,000 tons, which include some 65 major 
surface combatants and about 70 submarines (50 of them nuclear 
submarines) with aggregate displacement of 650,000 tons. 
In recent years, the Pacific Fleet has been on the decline in 
quantitative terms, with the two intermediate size aircraft carriers being 
taken out of service, and with its activity having been toned down, but it 
has continued to be modernized with the addition of Oscar-II-class cruise 
missile-mounted nuclear submarines and construction of Akula-class 
nuclear-powered attack submarines. 
(3) Air Forces. Russia continues to deploy approximately 
1,220 combat aircraft in the Far East. Although the number of such 
aircraft has decreased, the quality continues to be improved as the 
deployment of fourth-generation fighters, such as the SU-25 Frogfoot 
and Mig-29 Fulcum continues. 
Incidentally, some third-generation fighters, which were 
taken out of service, are considered to be in storage without being 
scrapped. 
Figure 8 shows the trend of Russian major naval force during 
recent decade.    From Figure 8, one can see the quantitative decline 
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Figure 8 
Trend of Major Naval Forces in Far East 
C.CHINA 
1. Politics 
China changed its policy line from revolution and class struggle 
to modernization and development of production capability in 1978. 
When the "Tiananmen incident" happened in 1989, conservatives 
regained lost ground within the government and reinstated a policy 
with greater emphasis on ideology of restraint over economic 
conditions. 
The present political posture reflects the balancing of the 
reformers and conservatives. The main point of the reformers is, 
"People must become affluent by the construction of the socialism that 
has the Chinese characteristics." Their policy places importance on 
an "open economy." On the other hand, the conservatives insist that 
"too much introduction of the Western economic system destroys the 
Chinese socialism" and their policy emphasizes, "The restriction of 
open economy" and "reinforcement of ideology regulation." The 
reformers are pragmatically seeking utility while the conservatives 
remain faithful to socialism, revolutionary ideas and shows a more 
fundamental  tendency.     Two points  common  to both  parties  the 
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maintenance of Communist Party system, and the acceptance of the 
partial economic superiority of the Western system. 
2. Diplomacy 
Recent experience reflects China has been focused on utilitarian 
and realistic diplomacy with Asian NIEs and ASEAN countries. It may 
be viewed as peace diplomacy aimed at the relaxation of punishment 
and avoidance of international isolation resulting from "Tiananmen 
incident".   Asian Security' says;15 
Chinese foreign policy in the recent past has demonstrated two 
basic patterns - conflict avoidance and active defense - which will 
probably continue to characterize its behavior. 
Here are some major points on Chinese recent diplomatic 
efforts. 
The first is the movement of Sino-Russian rapprochement. The 
Sino-Soviet talks began between the Parliamentary Vice-Minister for 
Foreign Affairs in 1982. The relations between the two countries have 
improved through efforts like the visits of President Gorbachev to 
China in 1991. The collapse of Soviet Union, however, has made the 
attitude of China prudent. The Chinese interest in the Spratly Islands 
made Russia postpone its wisdrawal from Gulf of Kamlan. As a whole, 
China seems to have been promoting the realistic Sino-Russian 
diplomacy emphasizing the modernization and pursuit of its national 
interest. Despite these situation, there is another aspect. 'Asian 
Security' says;16 
China's policy toward Russia, the most important of the new 
countries, was not simply economic in nature, but also involved an 
expansion of military ties. 
Although Sino-Russian military cooperation may not lead to a 
short-term dramatic shift in the balance of power in Asia, it is a long- 
term threat of considerable concern among other Asian nations. 
The second point is the Sino-American relationship.    As the 
result of "Tiananmen incident,"  the U.S.  applied  several types  of 
sanctions   and   the   relationship   between   the   two   deteriorated. 
15
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Recently, there have been signs of improvement in their relationship. 
These signs include the Chinese abstention from a resolution in the 
U.N. Security Council and allowing the use of armed force during the 
Gulf Crisis, and agreement among the EC's Foreign Minister 
Conference to remove the sanctions against the China in 1990. In 
spite of such a improvement, the Sino-American relationship has been 
complicated by the problem about the extension of most-favored- 
nation treatment. High levels of Chinese distrust still exists within the 
U.S. Congress . 
The third point is the Sino-Japan relationship. The Sino-Japan 
relationship has been improving since the normalization of diplomacy 
in 1972. Although it cooled down temporarily as the result of the 
"Tiananmen incident," a Cabinet meeting has been held every year 
since 1979, and Japan has been participating through economic 
cooperation and technical cooperation in broad fields. China has had 
strong concern about possible Japanese defense buildups and 
increased wariness over the dispatch of Japan Self-Defense Forces to 
the Persian Gulf and Cambodia. Although China needs Japanese 
capital, technological know-how, plant and business management in 
order to accelerate the modernization, China has considered any 
advance of Japan in Asia to be a threat against China. 
The fourth point is the diplomatic effort with neighboring 
countries. China has established diplomatic relations with Indonesia, 
Singapore, Brunei and Vietnam since 1990, and Korea in 1992. 
3. Economy 
China's recent economic policy has been based on the basic 
policy confirmed at the 13th Communist Party Congress in 1987. In 
this basic policy, acceleration and deepening of the economic 
revolution in the future was adopted and self-rehabilitation policy was 
changed to accept loans, investments and aid from foreign countries. 
As a result, foreign capital from NICs and Japan has been introduced 
vigorously. The rapid acceptance of open market policies caused the 
overheating of economy, inflation and widening of income disparity. 
As  a result,   the  conservatives  temporarily came  into  power and 
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established economic restraint policy in September 1988. This 
caused economic decline in 1989 and 1990. The reformers have 
come into power and the economy has again accelerated. "By the end 
of 1992, the growth rate had reached a remarkable 12.8%, and the 
amazing transformation of the Chinese economy attracted worldwide 
attention."17 Inflation soon followed. Moreover, the Chinese 
constitution was amended and a shift to the "Socialistic Market 
Economy System" was specified on 8th National People's Congress 
held in 1993. 
There are some factors obstructive to the economic 
development. According to the analysis by Social Science House of 
China published in the "Economic Research" in 1990, these factors 
are; 
- The pressure of population explosion to the society 
- The environmental pollution and destruction of nature 
- The arrival of the agricultural burden to the limit 
Five factors published in the "Half Moon Story" are; 
- The abnormality of distribution 
- The difficulty of distribution 
- The low rate of economic efficiency and danger of economic 
expansion 
- The blind development of economy 
- The potential pressure of inflation 
Figure 9 shows the trend of GNP during recent decade. It shows 
the China's GNP has been steadily increasing about average rate of 
9.4% (see Appendix A). 
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Note: These charts are expressed in U.S. dollars, based on 1991 prices and using a 1991 deflator. 
Figure 9 
Trend in Gross National Product(GNP) 
Figure 10 shows the trend in military expenditures. Military 
expenditures had deceased until 1986, but it started to increase after 
1987.   In 1990 it grew almost by 6.6% (see Appendix B). 
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Note: These charts are expressed In U.S. dollars, based on 1991 prices and using a 1991 deflator. 
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1991-1992 (U.S. Arms Control and  Disarmament 
Agency) 
Figure 10 
Trend in Military Expenditures 
20 
4. Military!» 
In ar. effort to eliminate disadvantages from redundancy of its 
military structure and to be ready for expanding to modem warfare, 
China is continuously moving to shift the emphasis of its military 
posture from people's warfare focusing on guerrilla warfare, which took 
advantage of its existing vast territory and huge population, to warfare 
by regular forces primarily dependent on integrated operational 
capabilities and quick response capabilities through coordinated 
operations of all services and branches. As part of the policy, China is 
modernizing its equipment and introducing foreign technologies while 
basically depending upon indigenous research and development. In 
recent years, China has demonstrated a policy that advocates the 
modernization of naval and air forces with special emphasis. 
a. Nuclear Weapon 
China has been continuing efforts to develop its own nuclear 
weapons since the 1950s as a means of securing deterrents and having a 
greater voice in the international community. China has ICBMs, 
approximately 100 IRBMs, and approximately 120 TU-16 medium-range 
bombers. At the same time, China is developing SLBMs and has deployed 
new IRBMs. China has been focusing on the enrichment and 
diversification of the nuclear weapons and carried out underground 
nuclear tests on October, 1993 and on June, 1994 despite the request to 
stop from the international society. 
b. Ground Forces 
China's ground forces total approximately 2,300,000. It is the 
largest in the world in size, but remains short of firepower and 
maneuverability on the whole. As part of the modernization of its armed 
forces, China has reduced its ground forces by more than one million 
personnel through organizational lining stream and has reorganized 
them into seven military regions from the previous 11 military regions. 
In an effort to improve operational capabilities, the army corps, which 
comprise infantry divisions and other elements, has been reorganized 
into group armies which integrate infantry, artillery and armor. 
c. Ncwal Forces 
The navy consists of three fleets - the North Sea, East Sea and 
South Sea Fleets - and possesses approximately 1,080 ships 
(approximately 80 submarines) with total displacement of 
approximately 950,000 tons and approximately 880 combat aircraft. 
Most of the ships are old and small, but modernization efforts are under 
way through the construction and deployment of LUHU class destroyers 
JIANGWEI class frigate capable of carrying helicopters as well as the 
latest missiles. 
As the result of the change in defense policy, the navy may be 
playing a large role rather than the pervious coastal defense role. 
Construction of modern navy has been underway since the latter half of 
1970s. One of the basic direction of the modernization is the 
construction of navy that can support the advance of China to the ocean 
and the other is the construction of mobile fleets consisting of SSBNs, 
Missile Frigates, Missile Destroyers and Helicopter Carriers. 
18
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Figure 11 shows the trend of the major naval forces of China. 
From this figure, one can see that despite the decline in number of 
ships, full tonnage has increased in FY1992. This means that China 
has shifted to the construction of larger ships (see Appendix J, K, P 
andQ). 
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Figure 11 
Trend of Major Naval Forces 
d. Air Forces 
The air force possesses approximately 5,290 combat aircraft, but 
its mainstay aircraft are old. They represent the older generation models after 
first-generation and second-generation fighters of the former Soviet Union. 
Lately, the Chinese air force has been striving to modernize its aircraft by 
developing and modifying the latest fighters such as the F-8II and incorporating 
the SU-27 fighter from Russia since 1992. 
D. SOUTH KOREA 
1. Politics 
It has  not been  long  since  South  Korea has  changed  into 
democratic state.   Main events are described below; 
1985 : The declaration of democratization by No Tae-woo. 
1988 : The first peaceful transfer of government to No Tae- 
woo. 
1990 : The birth of Democratic Liberal Party 
1993 :   The civilian Kim Young-Sam became the president. 
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Although the history of democracy is not long, South Korea has 
steadily established its democracy . 
2. Diplomacy 
Recently, South Korea has substantially improved their relations 
with the former Soviet Union, East European countries, China and 
other socialist countries.   Main events are described below; 
1981 : President Chun Doo-Hwan visited the U.S. at the first 
time. 
1984 : President Chun Doo-Hwan visited Japan as the first 
president. 
1990 : Established diplomatic relations with former Soviet 
Union. 
1991 : Joined to the U.N. at the same time with North Korea. 
1992 : Established diplomatic relation with China. 
1992 : Signed the treaty about basic relations with Russia. 
3. Economy 
From 1986 to 1988, Korea expanded exports supported by the 
weak won (currency), cheap crude oil and low interest rate and 
recorded a high rates of economic growth(approximately 12-13 %). 
They maintained a trade surplus of 9,800 million dollars in 1987 and 
14,300 million dollars in 1988. Since 1989, the trade balance 
deteriorated as a result of the rapid revaluation of the won against the 
dollar. Trade deficits recorded 4,900 million dollars in 1990, 9.650 
million dollars in 1991, and 5,500 million dollars in 1992. Despite 
these trade deficits, the real economic growth rate was healthy 8.4 %, 
supported by construction and investments in plant and equipment. 
The GNP per capita was 6,498 dollars in 1991. 'Asian Security, 
however, says;19 
South Korea must deal with a number of extremely difficult 
economic problems from overcoming the 'Korean syndrome' (to 
adjusting the structure) of the economy. Given the nation's high 
expectations of the economy, these are the areas that President Kim's 
economic planning team are working on. 
19
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Figure 12 shows the trend of the GNP during recent decade. 
South Korea's GNP has been steadily increasing about average rate of 
10.0% (see Appendix A). 
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Figure 12 
Trend in Gross National Product(GNP) 
Figure 13 shows the trend in military expenditure. Military 
expenditures have been steadily increasing since 1981, most notably 
by 10.0% in 1990 (see Appendix B). 









Note: These charts are expressed in U.S. dollars, based on 1991 prices and using a 1991 deflator. 
Figure 13 
Trend in Military Expenditures 
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4. Military20 
South Korea has several defensive disadvantages. Its capital, 
Seoul, where a quarter of the country's population is concentrated, is 
situated very close to the demilitarized zone(DMZ). It is surrounded by 
sea on three sides and it encompasses numerous islets along its long 
coastline. 
South Korea, perceiving North Korea's military buildup with 
enormous ground forces as a serious threat, has been spending around 4 
percent of its gross national product on national defense every year. In 
recent years, in addition to efforts to modernize its army, South Korea 
has been trying to modernize its naval and air forces by vigorously 
carrying out plans to introduce submarines, helicopter-carrying 
destroyers, P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft and F-16 fighters. 
South Korea's military forces is comprised of ground forces of 22 
divisions with approximately 550,000 personnel, naval forces of 
approximately 230 ships with total displacement of 140,000 tons and 
two marine divisions, and air forces of approximately 490 combat 
aircraft, most of which are F-4 and F-5 fighters, but include F-16 fighters 
(see Appendix P). 
Figure 14 shows the trend of major naval ship assets.   From this 
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Figure 14 
Trend of Major Naval Force 
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E. NORTH KOREA 
1. Politics 
In contrast to the movement toward democratization in former 
Soviet Union, East European countries and China, North Korea has 
been adhering to the despotic political system by Kim Il-Sung. Main 
political events are described below; 
1966 : Declaration of the independent policy course 
1967 : Declaration of basic policy outline consisting of "chuch'e 
thought" 
1972 : Amendment of the Constitution 
1973 : "5 great principles" presented by Kim Il-Sung 
1980 : Kim Jong-Il became the second leader 
1991 : Kim Il-Sung became the head of military forces 
Joined the U.N. 
1994 : Death of Kim Il-Sung and succession by Kim Jong-Il 
As a result of the admission into the U.N., North Korea became 
one of the members in the international society. It became impossible 
for North Korea to maintain its isolation. The increase number of 
exchanges between South Korea and an improvement of relationship 
with Western countries have inevitably brought more accurate 
information about liberalized economic systems and its development 
into North Korea. 
In addition to above, the death of Kim Il-Sung, coupled with lack 
of popularity of Kim Jong-Il, could lead to a sudden change in North 
Korea's direction. 
2. Diplomacy 
Before 1990, North Korea tried to establish a close relationship 
with China and former Soviet Union by utilizing and balancing the 
alliances with each country. As the result of the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between South Korea and former Soviet Union in 
1990, and South Korea and China in 1992, the relationship between 
North Korea and China and Russia has became deteriorated. On 
account of this, North Korea has been forced to pay for imported 
goods with international currency.   As a result North Korea has fallen 
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into awful financial predicament. In order to resolve these situation, 
North Korea is trying to establish a diplomatic relations with Japan. 
Major events are described below; 
1991 : The 1st round of Japan-North Korea diplomatic relations 
normalization negotiation 
1991 : Joined to the U.N. at the same time with South Korea 
1991 : The 5th round of talks between South and North Korea 
prime ministers ("A statement of mutual agreement on 
reconciliation, non aggression and interchange- 
cooperation") 
1992 : The 1st round of talks between the U.S. and North Korea 
vice-minister 
3. Economy 
'Asian Security says;21 
North Korea is one of the most secretive nations in the world, 
particularly with regard to its economy. There are practically no 
statistics of any kind issued, and those that are released are suspect. 
Nevertheless, it has been clear for some time that the North Korean 
economy is in a disastrous condition. 
North Korean economic growth rate is estimated to be negative 
since 1990.   'Asian Security says;22 
South Korean estimates are that in 1990 GNP shrank 3.7%, in 
1991 it dropped 5.2%, and in 1992 there was a further slow-down of 7.6%. 
These estimates put the 1992 GNP at 21.1 billion won, down from the 
dismal 22.9 billion won achieved in 1991. 
Although the national budget growth rate in 1990 exceeded that 
of 1989, there are no clear numbers that prove the results. The 
situation seems to have transferred from depression to extreme 
poverty. Also, as a result of bad weather over the years, North Korea 
has been facing a lack of food. 
Moreover, as the relation between North Korea and Russia 
became cool, North Korea has experienced serious shortages of fuel 
and power. The movement of ships or vehicles has decreased and net 
working rate of factories decreased by 50%.    The country's third 
21
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Seven-year Plan (from 1987 to 1993) seems to have fallen short of the 
goal by about 50%. 
While visiting to China in 1991, Kim IL-Sung asked China for 
economic support. China agreeded to less than half of North Korea's 
request in order to tighten the economic relationship with South 
Korea. As a result of the cooling of the relationship between Russia 
and China, who were North Korea's major trading partners, the 
domestic economy has turned worse. In order to resolve this 
problem, North Korea has approached Japan. However, it seems to be 
difficult to get the support from Japan because of unsolved problems 
such as post WWII compensation and nuclear inspection. 
Figure 15 shows the trend of the GNP during recent decade. 
North Korea's GNP has remained stagnant for the last eight years, but 
decreased and actually started to decline since 1989. It fell in 1991 
by 24.6% (see Appendix A). 
Figure 16 shows the trend in military expenditure. From this 
figure one sees that the North Korea's military expenditures has 
remained constant until 1988, but started to decrease in 1989 and fell 
significantly in 1991 by 24.6% (see Appendix B). 
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Figure 15 






Note: These charts are expressed in U.S. dollars, based on 1991 prices and using a 1991 deflator. 
Figure 16 
Trend in Military Expenditures 
4. Military23 
North Korea has enhanced its military forces since 1962 under 
four-point military lines: The whole people will be armed,' 'The whole 
country will be fortified,' 'All soldiers will be trained as cadre. Each 
person will be capable of performing the duties of his immediate 
superior,' 'All arms will be modernized.' Although North Korea is 
believed to be suffering from serious economic downturn, it is considered 
essential to allocate national resources to military forces with special 
emphasis (see Appendix P). 
a. Ground Forces 
The North Korea's ground forces comprise 26 divisions of 
approximately 1 million personnel, and it seems that the 2/3 of them are 
deployed at near the DMZ. Its war potential consists mainly of the 
infantry, but its armored forces and firepower includes 3000 tanks. The 
240mm multiple rocket launchers and 170mm cannons seem to be 
increasingly deployed along the DMZ. There are also special forces that 
are trained for a guerrilla war. 
b. Naval Forces 
North Korea's naval forces is comprised of approximately 620 
ships with a total displacement of 85,000 tons. The navy is made up 
mainly of small ships such as missile speed boats ships. There are 21 of 
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old-type Romeo class submarines, and approximately 60 Mizet 
submarines and approximately 100 of air-cushion landing crafts that 
seem to be used to support special forces. 
Figure 17 shows the trend of major naval force during the 
recent decade.    From this figure one can see that naval forces have 
been increasing since FY1990 (see Appendix N, O, P and Q). 
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Figure 17 
Trend of Major Naval Force 
c. Air Forces 
Air Forces possess approximately 810 combat aircraft, most of 
them are old, made in China and the former Soviet Union, but also 
possess 4th generation aircraft such as MIG-29 and SU-25. 
5. Nuclear Issue 
Although North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) in 1985, it has not signed a safeguard agreement with 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is obligatory 
under the above-mentioned treaty. Suspicion is growing that North 
Korea may be aiming to develop nuclear weapons of its own. Main 
events are described below: 
1992 : Conclusion of safeguard agreement (Apr) 
The 1st inspection by IAEA (May) 
1993 : Declaration of withdrawal from the IAEA (Mar) 
Reservation of withdrawal from the IAEA (Jun) 
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IAEA resolved the requirement for execution of safeguard 
agreement (Oct) 
UNGA resolved the requirement for acceptance of the 
inspection by IAEA (Nov) 
1994 : IAEA inspected 7 facilities but could not confirm the fact 
(Mar) 
Declaration by the chairman of UNSC (Mar) 
North Korea rejected the Declaration (Apr) 
North Korea withdrew from the IAEA (July) 
North Korea is believed to have produced and deployed missiles 
of the Scud B type as well as the Scud C type, which is a modification 
of Scud B with a longer range, and to have exported them to the 
Middle East. North Korea is now reported to be developing a new 
type of missile, Nodon I, which has a range about 1,000 km. 
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m. COUNTRY SITUATION OF JAPAN 
A GEOPOLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
It is important to consider the strategic position in order to 
analyze country situation of Japan. 
1. Geographical Characteristics 
Geographical Characteristics of Japan are summarized as follows. 
* Japan is located at the northeastern end of rimland that 
surround the Eurasian Continent, at the point of contact of Sea 
Power and Land Power. 
* Japan is a highly developed industrial island nation that lacks 
resources. 
* Land is long and narrow to the east-west along the continent, 
and as a result it lacks the deepness for defense. 
* Japan has close proximity to the Korean Peninsula. 
2. Strategic Characteristics 
Strategic Characteristic of Japan are summarized as follows. 
* Japan is located at the point of contact of U.S. and Russian 
power in North-East Asia. 
* Economic power and technological power is indispensable to 
the existence and prosperity of advanced nations, and valuable to 
the economic development and modernization of developing 
countries. 
3. Ocean Nation 
Japan is surrounded by oceans. There are two major factors for 
Japan to develop as an ocean nation. One is that Japan has had a 
geopolitical condition and the other is that Japan has lacked the 
resources for industry and food, thus Japan has had to depend upon 
imports from foreign countries. Since these factors will not change, it 
is indispensable for Japan to seek a way to develop as an ocean nation. 
The following statement is applicable to Japan.24 
24
   Lee   G.   Corder.   "Regional   Resilience.   The   Imperative  for  Maritime   Security 
Cooperation  in  Southeast  Asia," in Naval   War  College  Review  (Spring   1994),  p40 
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Southeast Asian sea lines of communication (SLOCs) lie at the 
confluence of Pacific and Indian Ocean trade routes and form the 
strategic heart of the region. The SLOCs are vital to the national security 
interests of all the regional states and to several major external states. 
4. Point of Connection with South-Going Policy of Russia 
On the process of developing as a modern nation since the Meiji 
Restoration, Japan has faced several national crises. Geopolitical 
elements of Japan have influenced such crises. For example, Japan 
faced directly the 19th century's south-going policy of Russia. After 
WWII, Japan has developed as a member of western nations. As a 
result of the end of the Cold War and collapse of former Soviet Union, 
the pressure of Russia's south-going policy has decreased. 
B. POLITICS 
1. Political System 
Japan has been developing a stable political system, adopting 
democratic and economic policies based on liberalism and capitalism. 
The cabinet is based on a parliamentary system and the cabinet party 
had been the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) and the parties out of 
power had been the JSP(Japan Socialist Party), DSP (Democratic 
Socialist Party), TCP (Japan Communist Party), Koumeitou, and other 
small parties. This system has continued since 1955 and had not 
changed in about 40 years. However, as the result of a murky financial 
accounting problem and factional dispute, the LDP was removed from 
the government in August, 1993 and a Coalition cabinet emerged. In 
a short time from the birth of the coalition cabinet, two Prime 
Ministers changed. In June 1994, the LDP-JSP coalition cabinet 
emerged and a JSP-member, Tomiichi Murayama, became the Prime 
Minister. These two parties had been opponents to each other for a 
long time. Reorganization of the parties out of power had proceeded 
and "Shin-Shin-Tou", was finally established in Dec, 1994. As a result 
of this reorganization, "Shin-Shin-Tou" became the second largest 
party, consisting of 214 members(LDP: 295, JSP: 140, JCP: 26, 
Koumeitou: 12, other 4 small parties: 24, non-party: 28). 
The basis of this new cabinet is not firm and several conflicts 
remain unsolved.    The future of this cabinet cannot be forecasted 
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easily. Moreover, it is not clear if the birth of the "Shin-Shin Tou" 
means a new movement toward the Two-Parry system. 
2. Security Policy 
Security policy of Japan consists of three elements, deterrence 
through the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, defense efforts of Japan itself, 
and diplomatic efforts to secure international relations. Japan has 
been making an effort to keep a strong connection with the U.S. by 
firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. security cooperation, as well as 
maintaining a minimum defense capability, in order to keep good 
relations with other countries. The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty has 
some key aspect for security of Japan.  These are; 
* Japan-U.S. Security Treaty provides the stable political basis 
for firm relation of alliance and cooperation. 
* A close cooperation, between Japan and the U.S. has 
contributed to the stability and development of the Asia/Pacific 
region. 
* The difference in military capability between Japan and Russia 
is large.   The deterrent through Japan-U.S. Security Treaty 
is essential for the maintenance of peace and stability of Japan. 
Norman D. Levin describes the interests of both countries on 
this treaty.25 
Japanese leaders adopted a two-pronged strategy to meet these 
interests: (1) to concentrate on expanding foreign markets for Japanese 
exports to foster economic development, while nurturing Japanese 
industries and gaining control over high-value-added technologies 
critical to Japanese industrial competitiveness; and (2) to minimize 
military expenditures and maintain a low political profile, relying on 
the United States to guarantee Japan's external security. U.S. threefold 
interests were equally clear: (1) to prevent communist expansion and 
domination of the Asia Pacific region by any hostile power or group of 
powers; (2) to maintain U.S. access to and through the region; and (3) to 
foster the spread of market-oriented economics and liberal democratic 
political system through out the region. 
25
   Norman   D.   Levin,   "Prospects   for  U.S.-Japanese   Security   Cooperation,"  in 
Danny  Unger &  Paul  Blackburn  (ed.), Japan's   Emerging   Global   Role 
(INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF DIPLOMACY BOOK, 1993), P72 
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C. DIPLOMACY 
Japan is said to be the world's second largest economy. 
However, Japan is a country that lacks almost all of the natural 
resources necessary to support its economy. In order to maintain 
prosperity, Japan has to depend not only on the peace and prosperity 
of the world but also on its effort to keep good diplomatic relation 
with other countries. Countries like Japan, who lack resources cannot 
exist only as a beneficiary who responds passively to the movement of 
the world. Japan has been increasingly prompted to play an increased 
role as a political and economical leader in the advanced countries. 
However, Masaru Tamamoto says;26 
Japan's postwar diplomacy has been marked by apologies; its 
diplomatic language is filled with words that such as earnest effort, 
goodwill, and understanding, often to the bafflement of U.S. diplomats 
who cannot tell whether Japan's promise to make an earnest effort is yes 
or no. 
Japan has to support the position as a member of the democratic 
countries taking care of promoting international dialogue, helping 
peaceful settlements of regional conflicts such as the Middle East, the 
Korean Peninsula, Indochina area, South Africa and South America. It 
is also important to assist in the modernization of East European 
countries and to support economic and technological efforts for 
developing countries. Adequate responses to the new order of 
political systems, arms reduction issues, and international economical 
systems of Post-Cold War period are basic diplomatic themes Japan 
must address.    Despite the need of these responsibilities, Japan's 
diplomacy is not sufficient.   There is one example as follows;27 
It was the Gulf crisis that sparked heated domestic debates about 
Japan's role in the international community, particularly regarding 
world peace and security. The Japanese people disagreed among 
themselves concerning the seriousness of the issue. Setting aside the 
Japanese hostage issue, the crisis had only a limited impact on the daily 
26
 Masaru Tamamoto, "The Japan That Wants to Be Liked," in Danny Unger & 
Paul Blackburn (ed.). Japans Emerging Global Role (INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY 
OF DIPLOMACY BOOK, 1993), P49 
27
 Yoshio Okagawa, "Japan's Global Responsibilities," in Danny Unger & Paul 
Blackburn (ed.), Japans Emerging Global Role (INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF 
DIPLOMACY BOOK, 1993), P55-56 
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lives of most Japanese. For this reason many people were inclined to act 
as if the crisis were someone else's concern. Public opinion was divided, 
and the proponents of "one-nation (unilateral) pacifism" hindered the 
Japanese government from fully participating in international crisis 
D. ECONOMY 
The Japanese economy suffered serious damages during the first 
oil crisis in 1973. Restructuring of the economy helped to create a 
stronger export sector, stronger Yen and increased economic growth. 
The average real economic growth rate of this period was 5.2% 
annually and exceeded the forecasted rate of 3.5 % by the government. 
The growth rate, however, has been declining since 1991 (4.0% in 
1991 and 1.3% in 1992) as a result of the "collapse of bubble" and the 
strong Yen. The growth rate of 1994 forecasted by the government in 
January was 2.4%, but average growth rates forecasted by 15 private 
enterprises in July was 0.95% and many enterprises used optimistic 
estimates.   Today, there seems to be only a gradual economic recovery. 
E. DEFENSE 
1. Outline Of Japan's Defense Program 
The defense policy that Japan pursues is based on the "Basic 
Policy for National Defense" adopted by Japan's National Defense 
Council (NDC), and approved by the Cabinet in May 1957 (see 
Appendix R). Defense buildup plans were put into effect based on this 
1957 policy. 
In order to implement its basic policy, Japan developed Defense 
Buildup Plan that was divided into four parts. These plans stressed 
the importance of improving fighting capabilities of the Japan Self- 
Defense Force (JSDF) and preparing the military for potential crises. 
With the completion of the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan in 1976, 
the "National Defense Program Outline (NDPO)" was adopted by the 
NDC and approved by the Cabinet in October 1976. The NDPO 
stipulates the appropriate level of defense capability Japan should 
maintain in peacetime and provides the guideline for improving 
Japan's defense capability, if necessary. Japan's military development 
since FY1977 has improved in accordance with the NDPO. 
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Since the NDPO was adopted by the Cabinet, the Government 
has ceased to formulate future defense plans. Instead, it was decided 
that a 'single-year formula' should be adopted so an annual review of 
Japan's defense posture could be made prior to the establishment of 
new policy. 
In October 1976, the government shifted to the policy of a 
"Defense Buildup for the Time Being", which placed a ceiling on 
defense expenditures of 1% of the GNP. 
In September 1985, the government drafted the Mid-Term 
Defense Program and implemented it during the period from FY1986 
through FY1990. This was elevated to the status of a government plan 
by subjecting mid-term estimates by the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) 
to the National Security Council (NSC) for the purpose of ensuring 
tighter civilian control. 
In January 1987, the government decided on a "Defense Buildup 
for the Future," replacing "Defense Buildup for the Time Being" (see 
Appendix S). This meant an amendment to the annual 1% of GNP 
expenditure limitation. 
After the Mid-Term Program was completed in FY 1990, the 
"Basic Policy on Defense Planning in and after FY1991" was adopted by 
the NDC and approved by the Cabinet on December 19, 1990. In this 
policy, "Defense Buildup for the Future" was stated as follows; 
Defense Buildup for the Future 
4. Although continued  careful attention must be paid to the 
movements in international society as above stated in 3, it could be 
understood, after all, that the trend toward stabilization of 
international relations, which was the premise of the formulation of the 
Outline, is now emerging much more than ever. With this understanding 
of the relevant situation, it is proper for us, under the basic policy 
outlined in 1 above, to continue to make efforts to improve an efficient 
and moderate defense capability in accordance with the basic principles 
of the Outline while maintaining the credibility of the Japan-U.S. 
Security Arrangements. These efforts will play an important role in 
preventing aggression against Japan and at the same time contribute to 
ensuring peace and stability in the region surrounding Japan. 
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In accordance with this policy, the "Mid-Term Defense Program 
(FY1991-1995)" was adopted by the NDC and approved by the Cabinet 
on December 20, 1990. 
In this program, 'Program Review' was stated as follows; 
Program Review and Others 
5. The   Program   shall   be   reviewed   whenever   necessary   in 
implementing it, and the program is subject to revision as necessary 
after three years within total amount of funding set forth in this 
program, taking into account the international situation, the trend of 
technological standards, economic and fiscal conditions and other 
factors in Japan. 
The "Amendment of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991- 
1995)'' was adopted by the NDC and approved by the Cabinet on 
December 18, 1992, one year prior to the planning in order to reflect 
the internal and external demands placed on upon the JSDF. Total 
defense expenditures were reduced by 580 billion Yen. 
2. Defense Expenditures 
a. Trends in Defense Expenditures 
From Figure 18 , the ratio of the Defense Expenditures to 
GNP has been under 1% of GNP since FY1967 except in FY 1987 
through FY1989. The ratios in FY1987 through FY 1989 were 1.004, 
1.013, and 1.006 % of GNP (see Appendix T). In general defense 
expenditures to GNP ratio increased during the 1980's and decreased 
since FY1990. 
With respect to the ratio of defense expenditures to 
national budget, it decreased from 11.32% in FY1958 to 5.13% in 
FY1981. From FY1981 to FY1988 the ratio increased to 6.53% then 
turned down again till FY1993 and settling at 6.41% in FY1994. 
In comparison to the growth rate of other major budget 
items (Social Welfare, Education and Science, and Public Works) from 
previous fiscal years, the growth rate of defense expenditure exceeded 
those of other major budget items for the first time in 1981. This 
trend continued until FY1989 (see Figure 19 and Appendix U). From 
FY1982 through FY1988 the growth rate of the defense expenditures 
exceeded that experienced by other major budget items.    However 
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since FY1991, the growth of defense expenditures was minimized in 
comparison to all of other expenditures. It showed a trend of 
declining, 3.8% in 1992, 1.95% in 1993, and 0.90% in 1994 and 
0.855% in 1995. 
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Figure 19 
Growth Rate in Major Account Expenditures 
b. Trends in Defense Expenditures Classified by 
Expenses 
Figure 20 shows the trend in defense expenditures 
classified by expenses. 'Personnel and provisions expenses' are 
outlays for salaries and meals for JSDF personnel. 'Current-year 
obligatory outlays' are expenses for contract development and 
continued projects previously approved by the Diet in preceding fiscal 
years. 'Current-year materials expenses' are allocated for the repair 
and improvement of equipment, the purchase of oil, the 
education/training of JSDF personnel and for the procurement of new 
equipment. From Figure 20, one can see that the growth rate from 
previous years of current-year obligatory expenses were higher than 
those of other expenses (see Appendix V). 
Figure 21 illustrates defense expenditures classified by 
expenses categories. From this figure one can see that the share of 
current-year obligatory outlays has been increasing on a yearly basis 
since FY1979.     On the other hand,  the shares of personnel and 
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provisions expenses and current-year materials expenses have been 
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Note: This chart is expressed in real Yens, based on FY1985 prices and a FY1985 deflator. 
Figure 20 
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Figure 21 
Share trends in Defense Expenditures by Expenses 
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IV. FEATURES OF THE JMSDF 
A. JMSDF BUDGET 
1. Trends in Defense Expenditures Classified by Organization 
Figure 22 shows the trends of the service budgets since FY1974 
and Figure 23 shows their share trends. Figure 22 indicates a steady 
budget growth for each service. Trend from Figure 23 reflect a 
decrease of approximately 5% of the JGSDF (normally 35%) in recent 
years. About 24% of defense expenditure is the JMSDF budget and 
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Figure 22 
Trends in Defense Expenditures by Organization 
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Figure 23 
Share Trends in Defense Expenditures by Organization 
2. JMSDF Budget 
The JMSDF budget is approximately 24% of the entire defense 
budget. Figure 24 shows the share trend in the JMSDF budget 
classified by expenses (personnel and provisions, current-year 
obligatory outlays, and current-year materials) (see Appendix Y). 
Figure 25 shows the share trend in the JMSDF budget classified by 
three components, personnel and provisions, front-line, and others. 
Front-line expenses are outlays for the procurement of ships and 
aircraft, etc. Since the late 1970's current-year obligatory outlay 
expenses and front-line expenses are larger than the other expenses 
of the JMSDF budget (Figure 24 and Figure 25). The priority of the 
JMSDF budget was shipbuilding and aircraft procurement expenses 
(see Figure 26 and Appendix Z). 
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Figure 24 
Share Trend in JMSDF Budget by Expenses 
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Figure 26 
Trends in JMSDF Front-line Expenses 
B. SHIP AND AIRCRAFT EXPANSION IN THE JMSDF 
1. Ship Expansion 
In the JMSDF, new ship types have been created every 7 to 10 
years on average for the last 40 years(see Table 1). The ship 
expansion pace has been fast and new ship types bring increased 
costs. 
Figure 27 shows trends in shipbuilding costs for the different 
types of ships (Escort Vessel : DE, Destroyer : DD, Guided Missile 
Destroyer : DDG, Submarine : SS) . In every type the real building cost 
per ship increased substantially. For example, in DE, the real building 
cost of ABUKUMA is 3.2 times as that of KITAKAMI. In the same 
manner, in DD, the HARUSAME's cost is 5.4 times of YAMAGUMO's, in 
DDG, the KONGO'S costs is 8 times of AMATSUKAZE's, in SS, the 
HARUSHIO's cost is 4.8 times of HAYASHIO's (see Appendix AA). 
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KITAKAM I CHIKUGO ISHIKARI YUUBARI ABUKUMA 
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Note; These charts are expressed in real Yen, based on FY1985 prices and a 1985 deflator. 
Figure 27 
Trend of Shipbuilding Cost (by Ship type) 
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In terms of the real building cost per ship per standard 
displacement ton, there is an ascendant trend like in the real building 
cost per ship (see Figure 28). There is a noticeable increase in the 
real building cost per ship per standard displacement ton between 
CHIKUGO and ISHIKARI in DE, between TAKATSUKI and HATSUYUKI 
in DD, between TACHIKAZE and HATAKAZE in DDG, and between 
UZUSHIO and YUUSHIO in SS. This difference represents significant 
qualitative improvement in ship's systems. In addition, the JMSDF 
started to equip missile weapon systems on all new ships. This high 
technology ship modernization with high technology effort started in 
the late 1970's. Ship modernization with highly efficient systems had 
an impact on the real ship building costs. As a result, the real ship 
building costs rose dramatically. 
2. Aircraft Expansion 
In the JMSDF almost all combat aircraft are Anti-Submarine 
Warfare (ASW) aircraft. From Figure 29 (also see Appendix AB), we 
can see the trend of ASW aircraft. New types of aircraft have been 
acquired about every 12 years in both fixed-wing aircraft and 
helicopter platforms. There were sudden increases of the real costs 
between HSS-2 and HSS-2B, and between HSS-2B and SH-60J in 
helicopters and between P-2J and P-3C in fixed-wing aircraft. The 
real cost of HSS-2B is 2.5 times as that of HSS-2, SH-60J cost is 1.58 
times as that of HSS-2B and P-3C cost is 2.3 times as that of P-2J cost 
(see Figure 30 and Appendix AC). P-3C's were equipped with 
computerized systems that could manage and process a lot of 
collected tactical information in a short time. HSS-2B's were 
equipped with enhanced capabilities to manage information, such as 
the tactical data display system (TDDS). SH-60J's based on SH-60B, 
included a newly developed Automatic Flight Management System 
(AFMS), and other tactical data management equipment. The sudden 
rise of real aircraft procurement cost reflected an enhancement of 
capability and performance. Acquisitions of P-3Cs and HSS-2Bs began 















■-6E-08  Z 
C3 
■-4E-08   o 
t: 
■-2E-08   § 
--0E + 00 














--6E-08   Z 
CD 
■-4E-08   o 
+2E-08   5 
OE + 00 





HAYASHIO O0SHO UZUSHO YUUSHIO HAMASHIO 
Note :   1. Yen/Ton In these charts are expressed In real Yens, based on FY1985 prices and using a FY1985 deflator. 
2. Line graph is measured by the right-hand scale. 
Figure 28 







Fiscal   Year 
Fiscal   Year 
Figure 29 
Trend of ASW Aircraft Inventories 
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Figure 30 
Aircraft Cost Trend (by Type) 
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C. THE POSTURE OF THE JMSDF IN THE NDPO 
The following refers to the posture of the JMSDF in the National 
Defense Program Outline(NDPO). 
1. The JMSDF must possess one fleet escort force as a mobile 
operating ship unit in order to quickly respond to aggressive action 
and such situations at sea. The fleet escort force must be able to 
maintain at least one escort flotilla on alert at all times. 
2. The JMSDF must possess, as ship units assigned to coastal 
surveillance and defense, surface anti-submarine capability of at least 
one ship division in operational readiness at all times in each assigned 
sea district. 
3. The JMSDF must maintain submarine units, anti-submarine 
helicopter units and minesweeping units, providing the capability for 
surveillance and defense missions as well as minesweeping at 
important harbors and major strains when such necessity arises. 
4. The JMSDF must maintain fixed-wing anti-submarine aircraft 
units in order to provide the capability of carrying out missions of 
surveillance and patrol of the nearby seas and ship protection. 
Description of the actual scales of organization and primary 
equipment under the foregoing concepts are given in its attachment 
(see Table 2). 
Basic Units 
Anti-submarine Surface-Ship Units 
(for mobile operation) 
Anti-submarine Surface-Ship Units 
(Regional District units) 
Submarine Units 
Mine sweeping Units 
Land-based Anti-submarine Aircraft Units 
4    Escort Flotilla 
10    Divisions 
6   Divisions 
2    Flotilla 
16    Squadrons 
Main Equipment 
Anti-submarine surface Ships 
Submarines 
Combat Aircrafts 
Approx. 60 Ships 
16  Submarines 
Approx.   220 Aircrafts 
Table 2  Inventory Level in JMSDF by NDPO 
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D. THE ROLE OF THE JMSDF 
1. General Role of the Military Strength 
Thomas E. Seal says,28 
Raw military power is still the bottom line in international 
politics. All elements of power are important, but a wealthy state with 
little military power has limited influence over a poorer one with a 
substantial military establishment. Japan and Germany may have 
wealth and influence, but they could not move Saddam out of Kuwait; nor 
can mere expression of outrage end tragedies such as those being played 
out today in the Balkans and the Horn of Africa. Unless the values of a 
target state leave it vulnerable to economic pressure or moral suction, 
military force will remain the final option for influencing the actions of 
that state. 
A summary of the general role of the military strength is as 
follows. 
a. Essential Role 
* Maintain military strength to defend own country 
b. Secondary Role 
(1) Diplomatic role 
* Provide a means to resolve the international 
issues 
* Exercise of influence on diplomacy 
* Represent the nation 
* Protect overseas property and interests, 
including protection of residents 
* Provide military power for international peace 
(2) Political role 
* Symbol of an independent country, 
demonstration of national prestige 
* Intelligence gathering 
(3) Social Role 
* Military power to maintain public order 
* Military power against terrorism 
* Military power to maintain public welfare 
28
  Thomas E.  Seal,  "Continuity  and Change  in U.S.  Security  Strategy," in Naval 
War  College   Review (Spring  1994), p31 
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2. General Role of the Naval Strength 
Prior to the discussion about the role of the JMSDF, it is 
necessary to recognize the general role of naval strength as a vital link 
in Japan's defensive posture. 
"A navy is characterized by the roles it is designed to assume. 
The many roles and mission of navies can be broadly grouped under 
three categories or types of Navies. These are: power projection 
navies, those capable of offensive operations against another countries; 
coastal-defense navies, those designed to defend the country against 
likely enemies; and constabulary navies, whose major function is 
surveillance of territorial seas and exclusive economic zones to protect 
political and economic claims. Under this scheme, navies are defined 
by their highest capabilities; for instance, power-projection navies also 
have coastal-defense and constabulary functions and coastal defense 
navies perform constabulary functions"29. 
I summarize the content of this analysis; 
Power Projection 
Navies with significant offensive capabilities — that is, a force - 
or power projection mission — are designed to attack enemy's territory, 
either by launching weapons of great destructive power from afar or by 
directly attacking the enemy's coast by landing troops and weapons 
(amphibious assault) . Power projection navies can be used either as 
independent forces or to support other combat operations, such as those 
carried out by armies and air forces. Few countries can maintain navies 
that are capable of projecting their power around the world, as these 
require the largest, most powerful, and therefore most expensive ships. 
The superpowers (the U.S. and Russia) have ocean-wide power projection 
navies, and the United Kingdom (U.K.) and France can use their small 
nuclear ballistic-missile submarine fleets for this purpose to a more 
limited degree. 
Many navies, however, have some capability for limited force 
projection through amphibious assault operations. The potential for 
success in such amphibious operations will depend on the defensive 
capabilities of the nation being attacked. For large-scale amphibious on 
well-defended coasts, landing ships must be supported by ships and air 
forces (usually operating from aircraft carriers) that bombard the enemy 
coast. Ownership of a few landing ships of varying capabilities does not, 
therefore, constitute a true amphibious assault capability. These limited 
forces might, however, be successfully used against small, lightly 
defended land targets. 
29
  Porpoises Among the Whales:  Small  Navies in Asia and Pacific  (Joseph R. 
Morgan)   p7 
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Coastal Defense 
Defense against attack from the sea is the most common justification for maintaining a navy. The size and makeup of a coastal 
defense navy depends upon a number of factors, including the 
capabilities of potential enemies; length and vulnerability of coastline; 
susceptibility of coastal installations (such as ports and naval bases) to 
attack; and the financial resources available to the nation. Navies 
designed exclusively for coastal defense against potential enemies of 
limited power can consist of small ships with limited range; such vessels 
do not require large crew or extensive maintenance facilities. Where the 
coastal geography is suitable, inexpensive defensive weapons such as 
mines may be used, thereby reducing the number of ships needed. In 
most cases, aircraft based on land supplement the defensive capabilities 
or the surface naval forces. And small submarines can be used with good 
effort to defend strategic waterways, such as narrow straits and 
approaches to ports. Land-based guns and missiles, which are relatively 
affordable even for small , weak coastal states, can reduce the need for 
surface ships and submarines. 
There is another description about the Navy's role.    Robert M. 
So of er says,30 
Former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney's regional defense 
strategy contained four critical elements useful for guiding defense 
planning and the development of U.S. military forces: Strategic 
deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and 
reconstitution. While the Navy has a role in supporting each of these 
elements, its forces and capabilities are particularly well suited for the 
forward presence and crisis response missions. 
3. The Current Role of the JMSDF 
From the geopolitical characteristics described in Section III-A, 
and the posture of the JMSDF described in previous subsection, the 
current role of the JMSDF is developed: 
a. Maritime Defense Strength as Self Defense Measure 
(1) Prevention of Invasions 
* Prevent the landing invasion from the sea. 
* Provide coastal defense 
* Protection of important harbors and straits 
(2) Securing the Safety of Maritime Traffic 
* Protection of important ships on the SLOCs 
* Defeat enemy forces that attempt to 
intercept and obstruct the SLOCs 
(3) Patrol 
30
 Robert M.  Soofer, "Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea," in Naval   War 
College   Review  (Spring   1994), p61 
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* Conduct patrol operations around Japan 
* Maintain a wide area of patrol 
* Collection and analysis of intelligence 
(4) Protection of lives and properties 
* Provide necessary action to protect citizens 
overseas and their properties 
b. Removal of Threats Cooperating with U.S. Navy 
(1) Participate in cooperative actions against the 
large-scale attack on Japan 
(2) Securing the safety of maritime traffic 
* Defeat enemy forces that attempt attack the 
SLOCs 
c. Maintenance of Regional Military Balance 
(1) Prevent invasion from occurring 
* Presence 
* Showing of deterrent function on the sea 
(2) Maintain order in the Asia/Pacific region 
(3) Maintain consideration about the apprehensions 
of neighboring countries against Japan 
d. Contribution to Maintain the International Order 
(1) Ensure regional security 
(2) Provide cooperation to the Peace-Keeping 
Operation (PKO) of U.N. 
E. LIMITATION ABOUT THE JMSDF 
As a result of internal limitations, the JMSDF has a unique 
characteristics compared with general navies.   This section analyzes 
these limitations. 
1. Legal Limitation 
a. Constitution and Right of Self-Defense 
According to the 'Defense of Japan' the relation between 
constitution and right of self-defense is described as follows;31 
After the WWII, Japan was resolved to ensure that the horrors of 
war would never be replaced, and has since made tenacious efforts to 
31
   Defense of Japan   1994  (Japan  Defense Agency) p62 
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establish itself as a peace-loving nation. The establishment of peace for 
all time is a sincere wish shared by the Japanese people. The 
Constitution, upholding pacifism, sets forth in Article 9 the 
renunciation of war, non-possession of war potential and denial of the 
right of belligerency of the state. As long as Japan is a sovereign state, it 
is recognized beyond doubt that the provision in the article does not deny 
the inherent right of self-defense that Japan is entitled to maintain as a 
sovereign nation. 
Since the self-defense right is not denied, the government 
remains firm in the belief that the Constitution does not inhibit the 
possession of the minimum level of armed strength necessary to exercise 
the right of self-defense32. On the basis of such understanding, the 
government has adopted an exclusively defense-oriented policy as its 
basic policy of national defense and has maintained self-defense as an 
armed organization, and has taken steps to improve its capabilities and 
to ensure their efficient operation. These measures do not present any 
constitutional problem ..., it is unconstitutional to possess what is 
referred to as offensive weapons that, from their own performance, are to 
be used exclusively for the total destruction of other countries, since it 
immediately exceeds the limit of the minimum level of self-defense 
necessary. Therefore, for instance, the SDF is not allowed to possess 
ICBMs, long-range strategic bombers or offensive aircraft. 
As   a   result, JMSDF   can   not   possess   the   following 
equipment under current legal limitation: 
* Offensive aircraft carrier 
b. Three Non-Nuclear Principles 
Another   legal   limitation   is   the   "Three   Non-Nuclear 
principles."   "Defense of Japan" also describes this as follows; 
Three Non-Nuclear principles refer to the principles of 'not 
possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting 
their introduction in Japan.' Japan adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles as the fixed line of national policy. 
The Atomic Energy Law also prohibits Japan from 
manufacturing or possessing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Japan 
ratified the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon in June 
1976, and placed itself under obligation, as a non-nuclear weapons state, 
not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons.33 
As   a   result,   JMSDF   can   not   possess   the   following 
equipment under current regal limitation: 
* Nuclear powered vessels and submarines 
* Nuclear weapons fSLBM. Tomahawk Missile, etc.) 
32
 Underline   is   inserted   by   author. 
33
 Defense  of Japan   1994  (Japan  Defense  Agency)  p65 
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In addition, Norman D. Levin says,34 
Important aspects of continuity should not be overlooked, 
however. Although Japan is no longer the too weak to defend itself 
against external danger, its unique and largely self-imposed limitations 
constrain its ability to provide single-handedly for its own defense. This 
is most obvious in the nuclear area, where Japan lacks any deterrent or 
second-strike capability, and it is also true regarding Japan's 
conventional capabilities: the Self-Defense Force remain uniquely 
unbalanced, for example, with no "offensive" weapons or power 
projection capabilities, and shackled by a host of political, technical, 
operational, and resource limitations 
2. Limitation on Japan-U.S. Coordinated Joint Action 
As described in Section III-B-2, the deterrent provided by the 
U.S. through Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is a core element of Japan's 
security posture. The significance of the Japan-U.S. security 
arrangements are "(1) Direct contribution to Japan's security, (2) 
Contributions to the maintenance of peace and security of the Far East, 
(3) Core of Japan-U.S. relations, and (4) Broad basis of foreign 
relations"35 Despite their significance, there are also some limitation 
on coordinated joint action.   Norman D. Leivin continues,36 
U.S.-Japan security ties-like the broader U.S.-Japan relationship 
- are nonetheless facing a rocky road. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
has only removed the sense of shared threat that gave immediacy to 
bilateral security cooperation, but it also has generated a whole new set 
of national preoccupations. Moreover, U.S. views toward Japan are 
experiencing a new and potentially dangerous volatility. The growing 
perception of Japan as a "threat" and potential "enemy" increasingly 
compares with earlier U.S. perceptions of the former Soviet Union and 
exacerbates the task of maintaining close cooperative relations. Such 
views are rogue factors in future U.S. security policy toward Japan. 
a. Requirement for Japan's Larger Share of 
Responsibility 
As described in Section II-A, the U.S. has been reducing 
its military forces, and as a result of this reduction, there is a growing 
34
 Norman   D.   Levin,   "Prospects   for  U.S.-Japanese   Security   Cooperation'"   in 
Danny  Unger & Paul  Blackburn  (ed.), Japan's  Emerging   Global  Role 
(INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF DIPLOMACY BOOK, 1993), P80 
35
 Defense of Japan   1994  (Japan Defense  Agency) p67~69 
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 Norman  D.   Levin,  "Prospects  for U.S.-Japanese  Security  Cooperation'"  in 
Danny  Unger &  Paul  Blackburn  (ed.), Japan's   Emerging   Global   Role 
(INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF DIPLOMACY BOOK, 1993), P81 
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requirement for Japan to assume a larger share of responsibility.  This 
attitude will continue toward   and during the 21st century. 
Japan's government decided to assume all of the burden of 
stationing USFJ from FY1995. As a result, these costs will put 
increased pressure on defense expenditures. 
b. Reduction of U.S. Forces in Japan(USFJ) 
The U.S. formulated the "East Asia Strategic Initiative 
(EASI)" during the Bush administration. This called for a phased 
reorganization and rationalization of U.S. forces in the East Asia/Pacific 
region. The plans initial stage (1990-1992) was completed as 
scheduled. As part of the reorganization plan and the termination of 
the U.S.-Philippines agreement over military bases, the U.S. withdrew 
all of its forces from the Philippines in 1992. Under the second phase 
(1993-1995), reduction of about 700 personnel stationed in Japan will 
be to be carried out."37 Despite the announcement of U.S. intentions 
to continue deploying Marine Corps and Air Force personnel in Japan, 
the U.S. has been reducing its forces, and this trend is expected to 
continue. 
c. Instability of U.S. Force's Coming and Helping 
As the unstable situation of Korean Peninsula and Middle 
East, etc. cannot be immediately resolved, the possibility of attack to 
Japan as the result of spread of these disputes seems to be higher 
rather than the possibility of an isolated attack directly on Japan. If an 
attack on Japan is the result of disputes from other regions, the 
reduced U.S. naval forces will be inadequate to respond to the multi- 
front conflict. Japan cannot deny the possibility of delay of the arrival 
of adequate U.S. Forces or possible lack of support due to reduced 
reserve forces. 
3. Financial Limitation 
As the financial characteristics of Japan, JSDF, and JMSDF were 
illustrated in the previous sections, there is a financial limitation on 
the development of JMSDF.    If Japan maintains the current defense 
37
   Defense  of Japan   1994  (Japan  Defense  Agency)  p57 
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policy even into the 21st century, these trends will continue. There is 
an approximate 3% economic growth rate, and defense expenditures 
are approximately 1% of GNP. The JMSDF share of about 24% of 
defense budget, and about 40% share of front-line expenditures. 
Moreover, an increase of personnel and maintenance costs and 
increase of the unit price of equipment are also predicted. 
4. Social Limitation 
a. Limitation on National Consciousness 
National consciousness about defense is not based on 
international awareness in Japan. Despite the recognition by 80% of 
Japanese people over the necessity of the SDF, only 6% recognize the 
necessity for expansion of defense capabilities38. 
Since Japan is the only country that has suffered the 
effects of nuclear weapons, the fear for nuclear weapons development 
has been inside the feeling of the Japanese people. This allergy has 
been disturbing even the peaceful development of nuclear energy, and 
the Japanese people are extremely passive about the use of nuclear 
power in defense issues. 
b. Limitation on Human Resources 
A long-term downward trend of the young population is 
another factor of social limitation. One of Japan's societal feature 
places a great value on attending college. As a result of securing high 
quality high school graduates has become increasingly difficult. 
Moreover, the current young population prefer individual life styles 
and dislike the constraints imposed by the life of SDF, etc. The trend 
of "Umi Banare"{Life apart from onboard) seems to increase in the 
future. 
F. WEAKNESS OF THE JMSDF 
We know the general role of the naval strength and the current 
role of the JMSDF through Section IV-D. The major premise that 
enables Japan to remove threats is a cooperative action with U.S. Navy 
based on the Japan-U.S.  Security Treaty.    This is one limitation 
3 8   This  number comes  from   "Public   Opinion  Survey  Regarding  the  SDF  and 
Defense  Issue"  conducted  in  FY1993(Jan.   13-23,   1994) 
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illustrated in a previous section.   Moreover, there is a weakness of the 
JMSDF when   comparing the fleet composition and aircraft assets. 
1. Comparison of Fleet Composition 
When comparing fleet composition, assets can be categorized 
into Aircraft Carriers (CV), Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN), Other 
submarines (SS), Cruisers, Destroyers (DD) and Frigates (FF), Mine 
Warfare Ships (M/W), Amphibious Warfare Ships (A/W), and others. 
Figure 31 and 32 shows fleet compositions with the numbers of 
ships, and displacement (full load tons) in natural logarithms in 
accordance to the above categories (see Appendix AD). From Figure 
31, it is clear that the U.S. Pacific Fleet is approximately one half of 
the entire Navy (submarines are one-third), and the Russian Pacific 
Fleet makes up one-third of the entire Russian Navy. The French Navy, 
the U.K. Navy and the JMSDF take similar shapes. From Figure 32, we 
can see obviously that all of the countries above, except for Japan, have 
well balanced fleet compositions. The JMSDF lacks strategic 
capability against other countries as well as air cover in areas beyond 
the regions covered-areas by the fighters of JASDF. 
2. Comparison of Aircraft Assets 
Figure 33 show the aircraft asset comparison of each navy. They 
are categorized into Bomber (BBR)and Fighter (FTR), Anti-submarine 
Warfare (ASW) Aircraft and Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) aircraft, 
Electronic Warfare (EW) aircraft, Airborne Early Warning (AEW) 
aircraft, Commando (CDO) aircraft, and Mine Countermeasure (MCM) 
aircraft. From Figure 33, we can recognize that major features of the 
JMSDF are ASW, MR, and MCM aircraft. From Table 3, we can see the 
qualitative aspects of each countries' aircraft inventories. 
3. Summary 
In comparison with the general navy, in respect to both its role 
and composition, Japan's lack of balance is directly results from: 
* Lack of strategic weapons (ex: SSBN) 
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V. FORECAST OF THE COUNTRY SITUATION AROUND JAPAN 
This  section will  describe the  forecast of country situation 
around Japan based on the situation described in Chapter II. 
A. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
1. Politics 
In Chapter II, the complicated characteristics and mechanisms 
of policy making process was illustrated. In light of these 
characteristics, and history shows that a periodic change of the 
balance of power within each element, the basic structure seems to be 
unchanged. It is most likely that it will remain so even in the early 
21st century. 
2. Diplomacy 
Based upon the fundamental idea of diplomacy, the U.S. will 
maintain a leadership role in order to achieve international 
cooperation. Although the probability that the U.S. will take a 
complete nonintervention policy is low, the opposite extreme of "the 
policeman of the international world" will be unlikely. 
3. Economy 
The "Twin deficits" will most likely be resolved and the U.S. 
economy will recover from the recession as the result of effective use 
of resources distributed from disarmament, the increase in 
international competitive power based on the supremacy of 
technology, and the beneficial effects of NAFTA. Although the recovery 
speed is not fast, the U.S. economy will continue on a steady growth. 
4. Military 
The principles of the new defense strategy can be expected to 
prevent a big reduction in military capability when compared to that of 
Cold War era and the early 21st century. Nevertheless, as a result of 
the reduced prospect of world wide war, military forces are expected 
to be reduced by more than 25%. This would increase the need for 
allied countries to expand their defensive capabilities. 
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With respect to the Asian region, the U.S. will maintain the 
regional security arrangement based on bilateral alliances. Kenneth B. 
Pyle says,39 
Although U.S. decline is presumed, the security role is still 
needed. This dependence on the alliance implies resentment over the 
continued deference to U.S. political leadership, but Japan grudgingly for 
the time being pays that price. The point that needs to be emphasized is 
that the United States still has the ability to shape the institutional 
structure of a new regional order. 
With the exception of Japan, forward deployment forces of other 
countries will be reduced drastically. 
B. RUSSIA 
1. Politics 
With the dissatisfactions that the nation has been experiencing, 
it is not likely that any kind of strong political power will emerge from 
a reformer's coup. We cannot deny the existence of dangers such as 
the rise of anti foreign nationalism, a resurgence by the conservatives, 
and military coup d'etat, etc. 
Although the 'Democratic Russia', and the supportive nucleus of 
President Yeltsin have split, he still maintains the support by 
approximately 40% of the nation, and has not fully lost his power. 
However, as the probability of the success of economic revolution and 
establishment of market economy decreases, the power of the 
president will also   decline. 
Despite these downfalls, there is no other strong leader who can 
establish the order of a confused Russian economy and society at this 
point, Yeltsin might keep the position into the early 21st century. 
2. Diplomacy 
a. Diplomacy with the U.S. 
The agreement at Camp David in Feb., 1992 seems to 
provide the basis for the dissolution of mutual hostile relations, and 
the start of cooperative relation. 
39
   Kenneth  B.  Pyle,  "Japan  and  the  Future  of Collective  Security,"  in  Danny 
Unger & Paul Blackburn(ed.), Japan's Emerging  Global Role   (INSTITUTE  FOR 
THE STUDY OF DIPLOMACY BOOK, 1993), pi 13 
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b. Diplomacy with China 
If the efforts of mutual arms reductions along the border 
and the mutual trust-building efforts continues, then normal bilateral 
Sino-Japanese relationships can be developed and maintained. 
c. Diplomacy with Korea 
The treaty of friendship has been concluded in August, 
1992 with South Korea, emphasizing economic aspects. Ruso-North 
Korean relations, both political and economic have become estranged 
because of Russia's decision to maintain diplomatic ties with South 
Korea. 
d. Diplomacy with Japan 
The Russian diplomatic strategy with Japan, which 
declared the non-separation of politics and economy for the resolution 
of the northern islands issue, has secured the economic support from 
Japan. 
Although there is a high probability that Russia will return 
two islands(Habomai, Shikotan), the likelihood that Russia will return 
the other two islands(Kunashiri, Etorofu) remains remote due to their 
strategic consideration to maintain the Sea of Okhotsk as a submarine 
sanctuary. As a result, drastic improvement of Japan-Russia relation 
may not be achieved in near future. 
3. Economy 
As we saw in the Chapter II, the economic situation of Russia has 
worsened year by year. The bread prices went up 300% and gasoline 
500%. There is little probability that the Russian economy will make 
substantial progress within the near future. There are two ways to 
revitalize the economy; the first is to continue to reduce the military 
expenditures, and the second is to promote liberalization. It is 
difficult to predict when the Russian economy will recover from 
current quagmire. It will not be surprising if the recovery is to take 
more than 10 years. 
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4. Military 
The new Russian Federation National Defense Law in 1992 states 
that Russia is committed to the reduction of its military forces until 
year 2000.  Vladimir I. Ivarov says,40 
Among potential sources of military threats to Russian security, 
the military doctrine mentions: 
* Territorial claims to the Russian Federation 
* Potential for local wars and military conflicts close to Russian 
borders 
* The use of nuclear weapons, including unauthorized use 
* The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the 
means of their delivery, and advanced military technologies 
that can change the balance of forces 
* The erosion of strategic stability as a result of quantitative 
and qualitative military buildup 
* Enlargement of military blocs and alliances threatening the 
military security of the Russian Federation 
The   new  doctrine   emphasizes   defensive   characteristics   as 
compared offensive doctrine of the former Soviet Union. 
a. General 
(1) Reduction of quantitative production capability 
(2) Slimming of military force 
(3) Qualitative improvement 
(4) Increase of defense capability in the Pacific 
region 
b. Strategic Nuclear Forces 
(1) Qualitative improvement of SLBM 
(2) Capability improvement of strategic bombers 
c. Ground Forces 
(1) Maintenance of the quantity of Far East Forces 
(2) Maintenance of high fighting capability 
d. Naval Forces 
(1) Qualitative improvement and quantitative 
reduction of vessels(including submarines). 
(2) Improvement of offensive capability by adopting 
SLBM 
40
   Vladimir  I.   Ivanov,  "Russia's  New   Military  Doctrine:   Implications  for  Asia, 
in  Michael  D.   Bellows(ed.). Asia  In  The  21st Century  .'Evolving  Strategic 
Priorities  (INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, 1994), p211-212 
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e. Air Forces 
(1) Qualitative improvement by introducing 4th 
generation aircraft 
(2) Development of high quality aircraft 
C.CHINA 
1. Politics 
The present political condition illustrates one that balances the 
concerns of reformers and the conservatives. Some observers say that 
a conclusion to this power struggle must occur before making any 
accurate prediction for the future of China. On the other hand, other 
observers say that this struggle only represents a power conflict. They 
suggest that a pure form of socialism and a spirit of communism 
become extinct with the trauma of the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution. As the first generation of revolutionary leaders disappear 
in the near future, a more pragmatic and nationalistic socialism will be 
pursued. The report of the central committee of the 14th Party 
Congress held in October, 1992 embodies this outline. This report 
reaffirms the creation of "a socialist market economy" characterized by 
"socialism with Chinese characteristics." Major points of this report 
are; 
* Acceleration of economic revolution by centering the 
establishment of socialist market economy 
* Promotion of outward-opening policy, and the use of foreign 
capital, resources, technology , and management experience 
* Reinforcement of Defense Capability 
* Accomplishment of autonomous and independent peaceful 
diplomacy 
Important issues facing Chinese politics toward the early 21st 
century are the decline of leadership as a result of the political 
corruption, increased pressures toward democratization, and the 
movement of Sinocentrism. 
2. Diplomacy 
We saw four aspects of Chinese current diplomacy in previous 
chapters.    On the whole, China has been seeking to escape from the 
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international isolation and eliminate criticisms from the U.S. It has 
also placed emphasis on its economy rather than its ideology. In order 
to accomplish its modernization it needs international help. China 
seems to have developed diplomacy that is intended to improve and 
reinforce its relationship with developed Western countries. Major 
points in the early 21st century are; 
* Obtain economic and technological support from Japan and 
the U.S. 
* Promote improvement of relations with South-East Asian 
countries and Russia in order to prevent the expansion of 
influences of Japan and the U.S.. 
* With respect to the relation with Taiwan, there is less 
probability of unity. 
Xu Xiaojun says, "In analyzing Chinese foreign policy, one must 
understand that in order for China to continue its economic 
development, it must have good relations with other countries."41 
3. Economy 
Xu Xiaojun says, "Developing its national economy is the 
centerpiece of China's grand strategy for the remainder of this century 
and the first half of the 21st century."42 
In the early 21st century, Chinese economic policy in the coastal 
areas will likely succeed by introducing the capital from Japan and the 
Western countries. Only a limited success, however, is expected in 
the non-coastal area of China. As a result of the significant difference 
in the internal growth among the regions and between the rich and 
the poor, dissatisfaction among the Chinese people could increase and 
lead to political instability. 
41
 Xu Xiaojun, "China's Grand Strategy  for the 21st Century," in Michael  D. 
Bellows(ed.),   Asia  In  The  21st  Century   -.Evolving  Strategic  Priorities 
(INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, 1994), p40 
42
 Ibid. p27 
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4. Military 
As the Chinese government has been declaring that "Taiwan is 
peculiar land of China," and "China does not ignore the independence 
of Taiwan," China may only be able to resolve this problem using 
military strength. Strong naval military capabilities are necessary to 
prevent the independence of Taiwan. The decline of the Russian 
threat has provided a great opportunity to develop and maintain this 
naval capability. In relation to the development of its economy, China 
seems to be continuing to develop its military strength and is paying 
particular importance on naval capability. Table 4 shows the flow of 
China's Naval Strategy. 






















jinhai zhonghai yuanhai 
yuanyang 
Definition 1 0-200nm 200 - 600nm 600+nm 
Definition 2 100km - 12nm 12 - 350nm 350+nm 




Definition 4 incide the 1st 
island chain 
between the 1st 
and 
2nd island chain 
beyond 
Definition 1 from Military Terms of the PLA. p.430. 
Definition 2 and 3 from Li Qianyuan. 
Definition 4 is a summary of Adm. Liu Huaqing's statement and A History of the PLA Navy. 
Source: Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, The Chinese Navy's Offshore Active Defense Strategy- 
Conceptualization and Implications," in Naval War College Review, Summer 1994, pl9 
Table 4  The "Offshore Concept in Chinese Naval Strategy 
Characteristics that can be predicted from the above table are: 
* Global operational radius 
* Independent sea and air control capability 
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* Strong rapid response capability 
* Strong amphibious capability 
* Certain degree of Nuclear threat 
D. SOUTH KOREA/NORTH KOREA 
As we saw in the current situation, South Korea has steadily 
established democracy in a short period, and has been developing 
economically. On the other hand. North Korea has remained in 
international isolation. In particular the poor economic condition of 
North Korea since the end of Cold War seems to have even worsened. 
Without active economic support of foreign countries, North Korea 
might resort to some drastic measure. Current investment initiatives 
lead by South Korea might lay foundation for peaceful unification of the 
two Koreas. 
1. Politics 
A "New Korea" will probably try to reconstruct the South Korea 
style domestic political system and include some opposition parties. 
2. Diplomacy 
A reunited Korea would make an effort to improve its 
international position by strengthening relations with ASEAN, 
European countries as well as expanding exchanges with Russia and 
China, but the core of these efforts will focus on the friendship with 
the U.S. and Japan. 
3. Economy 
The absorption and unity with North Korea may weaken the 
economy of South Korea. The costs of unification may largely depend 
upon the unification timing and level of success of the pre-unification 
investment by the South to North Korea. However, the factors that 
reduce the costs of unification to South Korea (e.g. later unification 
date, successful pre-unification investment to North) could also reduce 
the probability of the unification itself. 
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4. Military 
As a result of the unity, the strength of the military of the new 
Korea will increase. " Threat" is evaluated by "ability" and "intention", 
and Korea will definitely increase its ability. Fortunately, current 
Korean intentions do not threaten other countries. However, security 
arrangement in Asia region is different from those of Europe. Up to 
this point, bilateral security arrangements have been most common to 
obtain. If each of the these countries (Japan, China, and New Korea) 
seeks the supreme position in this region, then the military strength 
will be a major element of this competition. In such a situation, 
despite its peaceful intention, Korea must be identified as "potential 
threat". Moreover, if New Korea has Nuclear Arms capability and a 
method of delivery then it will become a stronger "potential threat" 
than that of the era of North/South Korea. 
E. PECULIARITY OF ASIA/PACIFIC REGION 
In order to forecast the total situation of this region, it is 
necessary to identify the characteristics of the environment in the 
Asia/Pacific region. Here are some characteristic of the environment 
in the Asia/Pacific region. Although the Cold-War had ended, this area 
can not be treated as same as the Europe. 
1. Impact of Collapse of Russia 
Unlike the western countries, those in the Pacific have not been 
developing advanced defense systems simply to meet the military 
threat of former Soviet Union. The collapse of former Soviet Union, 
however, did not mean the dramatic change of security environment. 
The level of military tension has not deceased rapidly. On the 
contrary, Asian countries have been trying to pay more attention to the 
security issues and the development of military power after the end of 
Cold War. 
2. Fluidaization of Power Relationship 
One important characteristic of the period of the Cold War is the 
efforts of Asian nations to construct their own nation and establish 
their identity.   This constitutes one reason why the Asian region has 
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become the stage for a fierce leadership struggle between the East and 
the West. As a result of the end of the Cold War, power relationships 
have become fluid.   Lee G. Cordner says,43 
The security environment in Southeast Asia is both complex and 
fluid. Changes in the involvement of external powers, the emergence of 
regional powers, the continued existence of established bilateral and 
multilateral alliances, and proposals for new groupings all contribute to 
an atmosphere of uncertainty. 
Young Asian countries have begun to seek their own security 
policies and attempted seriously to deal with their own security issues. 
Economic   development   and   political   motivation   for   military 
development described above are one characteristic. 
3. Immaturity of Security System 
Tension across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in the Korean 
Peninsula and the probability of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation 
shows the precarious nature of Asian securities. At this moment, it is 
difficult to make firm predictions concerning the timing and method 
of Korean unification. China continues to have unresolved problems 
despite its possible economic development and modernization. In 
Indochina, the war in Cambodia has finally ended, and Vietnam and 
other nations are about to enter a period of economic construction. 
Conflicts among several nations over the territorial claims to islands 
scattered off the coast of Vietnam may develop into a military clash. 
All this shows that a fully stabilized political and military situation does 
not yet exist in this region. 
4. Geopolitical Characteristic 
As described on the part of geopolitical characteristics of Japan, 
the North-East Asian and North-West Pacific are areas of interests that 
the U.S., Russia and China have been concentrating. Russia and China 
are demonstrating the characteristics of a oceanic nation. Moreover, 
these three nations have nuclear weapons. The U.S. will continue to 
have interest in this region, not only from the security viewpoint but 
43
   Lee   G.   Cordner,   "Regional   Resilience-The   Imperative   for   Maritime   Security 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia," in Naval  War  College  Review, Spring  1994, p45 
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also   in   light   of its   growing   trade   interests.      Lee   G.   Cordner 
continues,44 
The United States continues to have in the region many national 
interests, which can be summarized as follows: Preventing the 
domination of Asia and the Pacific, either politically or militarily, by a 
single state or group of states; maintaining U.S. access to resources and 
markets and strengthening U.S. economic competitiveness-an objective 
to which the integrity of the SLOCs is central; supporting the security of 
friends and allies; and encouraging the development of democratic 
institutions, freedoms, self-determination, and human rights. 
F. ENCOUNTERING PHENOMENA OR EVENTS 
In general, several types of likely dangers are discussed. 
Some of these are "(1) the question that whether the five 
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council will 
continue to have the will and ability to play a constructive role in 
the international community, (2) localized military clashes and 
(3) proliferation of weapons and arms-related technologies."45 
G. FACTORS OF USE OF MILITARY FORCE THAT AFFECT JAPAN 
This section consider factors that cause the use of military force 
that might affect Japan. 
1. Russia 
(1) The imbalance of power in the Far East region 
(2) The decline of military strength of the U.S. in the Far 
East region 
(3) The aggravation of Japan-Russia relation (territorial 
issue, economic support issue, etc.) 
(4) The spread of dispute in the other regions 
(5) The conversion to the policy by force as a result of the 
rise of the conservatives or the military authorities 
(6) The spread of domestic disputes 
44
 Lee   G.   Cordner,   "Regional   Resilience-The   Imperative   for   Maritime   Security 
Cooperation  in  Southeast Asia," in Naval  War  College  Review, Spring   1994, p45 
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 Advisory  Group  on  Defense  Issues,  "The  Modality  of the  Security  and 
Defense   Capability   of Japan   -   The Outlook  for the 21st Century-",   1994,   p4 
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2. China 
(1) The imbalance of military power in the Far East region 
(2) The decline of military strength of the U.S. and Russia 
in the Far East region 
(3) The aggravation of Japan-China relations 
(4) The spread of dispute in the other regions 
(5) The resolution of the territorial issues 
3. United Korea 
(1) The unbalance of power in the Far East region 
(2) The aggravation of Japan-United Korea relation 
(territorial issues, economic support issues, etc.) 
(3) The transformation of the domestic issues (economic 
slump, etc.) 
(4) The spread of regional disputes 
H. THE CRISIS SITUATION 
Taking previous sections of this chapter into consideration, the 
following "what if scenarios are constructed for the possible crisis 
situation in the early 21st century. 
1. Direct Threat Scenarios 
a. Invasion by Russia 
(1) Probability of Occurrence. There seems little 
probability of this type invasion occurring in the period, however, we 
can not fully discount the possibility in the period beyond. 
(2) Degree of Threat. In light of its professed 
intentions, there seems no threat, however, Japan cannot help feeling 
threatened from the aspect of their enormous military capability. 
Although military capability seems to decrease quantitatively, military 
industries will be kept operational in order to export arms. Russia will 
maintain a high qualitative ability in this region. 
(3) Propriety of Coping. There is little need of a 
defense capability to cope with this type threat because of the small 
probability of its occurrence in the target era. However, since this 
type invasion requires a great deal of defense capability, the basic 
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defense capability that enables Japan to respond rapidly to the change 
of intention of Russia must be maintained. 
b. Invasion by China 
(1) Probability of Occurrence. The probability of this 
invasion is not high, however, this threat has the highest probability of 
all the possible direct invasions. 
(2) Degree of Threat. China is the only communist 
country in the region, and its Sinocentrism based policy could become 
a great threat to the neighboring countries. There are several 
unsolved issues between China and Japan such as possession issue of 
Senkaku Island, and continental shelf issue in the East China Sea. 
Modernization and the outright expansion of the naval strength of 
China is likely to become a significant threat to South-West Islands and 
maritime traffic of Japan. 
(3) Propriety of Coping. With respect to the Sino- 
Japan dispute based on territorial issues, there may be a possibility 
that the national interest of Japan and that of the U.S. will not match. 
As a result, it is difficult for Japan to expect the U.S.'s full military 
support. In this case, Japan will have to maintain a certain degree of 
defense capability so Japan can resolve this issue by itself. 
c. Invasion by United Korea 
(1) Probability of Occurrence. There is a little 
probability of this type of invasion in the target era. 
(2) Degree of Threat. There is a little threat. A new 
Korea would be likely to keep good relations with Japan and the U.S. 
in order to focus its military strength against China and Russia. 
However, there is a territorial issue concerning Takesima island, and 
there is also historical anti-Japan feeling among Korean people. There 
is a probability that these two issues could be combined and develop 
into a dispute between both countries. 
(3) Propriety of Coping. There is little necessity of 
coping. However, the modernization of New Korea will influence the 
balance of power in East Asia, and directly influence the defense of 
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Japan.  We will have to pay close attention to the movement of a united 
Korea. 
2. Indirect Threat Scenarios (Repercussion From Other regional 
Conflict) 
a. limitation of Use of Specific Sea Area 
(This is a scenario that the regional disputes concerning 
territorial and ocean resources will threaten the safety of maritime 
traffic of Japan) 
(1) Probability of Occurrence. This scenario has a 
higher probability than any other threat scenarios considered here. 
For example, a dispute in the South China Sea arising from the Spratly 
Island issue may spread and influence the maritime traffic of Japan. 
(2) Degree of Threat. As described in Chapter III, 
the Japanese economy relies largely on maritime transportation. The 
security of maritime traffic is vital to the survival of Japan. Japanese 
sea lanes are spread all over the world, and any regional dispute will 
have serious implications for Japan. 
(3) Propriety of Coping. Japan needs to respond to 
this type situation based upon the region and degree of the dispute. It 
is difficult for Japan to secure the safety of maritime traffic only by its 
defense capability. Therefore, it is important to closely coordinate 
with the U.S. and try to resolve the dispute by multinational military 
action lead by the U.N. Needless to say, but such action must be the 
last result after every effort to resolve the dispute through diplomatic 
and economic actions. 
b. Participation to the Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO) 
(1) Probability of Occurrence. There seems to be 
high probability of occurrence of regional disputes. PKOs lead by the 
U.N. have a great role in the resolution of that dispute. Japan will be 
required to provide both monetary and human contribution to PKOs. 
(2) Degree of Threat. This threat is not direct one, 
however, there is anxiety that Japan will be isolated as the results of 
insufficient human contributions. 
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(3) Propriety of Coping. The peace and security of 
Japan is closely related to the stability of the world, specifically Asia 
region. As a result, the participation to PKO contributes to the 
defense of Japan. Japan must avoid becoming isolated in the 
international society by neglecting its duties as a major but non-super 
power country. 
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VI. NEW FEATURE OF THE JMSDF 
A. FACTORS AND CONTINGENCIES FOR THE JMSDF TO CHANGE ITS 
DEFENSE POLICY 
This   section   summarizes   the   factors   and   contingencies 
described in previous chapters that might influence the future JMSDF 
policy. 
1. Meaning of End of Cold War 
As a result of the end of the Cold-War, the U.S. has been 
reducing its military forces including those in the Asia/Pacific region. 
During the Cold-War, the U.S. needed Japan to be an ally against the 
Eastern Countries, especially Russia. However, from U.S. perspective 
and despite many common interests, the end of Cold-War means a 
reduction of the imperative need of Japan for U.S. since the overriding 
common threat had decreased. Moreover, the secondary demand for 
Japan's cooperation which has been put aside during the Cold War era 
has taken a more prominent role. 
From Japan's public perspective, the apparent decreased threat 
means less support for U.S. initiatives. Japan, however, actually needs 
more U.S. support in the event of potential regional conflicts. 
2. Emergence of New Power 
China's GNP and economic development has been increasing at 
an outstanding rate. Supported by economic developments, China has 
been reorganizing and modernizing its military forces. In the area of 
the naval force, China may be changing from coastal defense to ocean 
navy (see Table 4, p.72). 
3. Decrease of U.S. Pacific Naval Forces 
As we saw in Chapter II, major U.S. naval forces have been 
decreasing since 1989. The number of ships in 1994 fell to 66% of 
that in 1988 and the total tonnage decreased to 80% of that in 1988. 
During the same period the U.S. public has become more concerned 
with domestic issues than international events. As a result, the U.S. is 
expected to be less willing to respond to the regional conflicts of 
Japanese concern. 
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4. New Movement of United Korea 
The Korean peninsula may be united within 10-15 years. This 
means an emergence of powerful military country in this region. 
Keeping good relations with a united Korea is essential to the security 
issue of Japan. 
5. Lack of Balance of Maritime Self Defense Force 
As we saw in Chapter IV, U.S. and Japanese naval physical assets 
are complementary reflecting the Cold-War era strategy. As a result, 
Japan individually lacks a balanced force when compared with other 
medium sized countries. In light of the fact Japan might not receive 
timely U.S. cooperation in the regional conflict, Japan might consider 
developing more balanced forces to reduce the probability of such 
predicament. 
B. CHANGE OF LEGAL LIMITATION 
As we saw in previous chapter, legal limitations, including the 
Constitution, hinder the development of a more balanced JMSDF. Not 
only in regards to the military area but also in the other related areas, 
legal limitations have been a large barrier for Japan to respond 
positively and promptly to the U.S. requests. Until recently, the U.S. 
could accept these limitation, however, now the U.S. may find the 
alliance less beneficial if Japan continues to adhere to these legal 
limitations. Following changes in legal context regarding JSDF could 
enhance the Japan's security.   Necessary changes may include: 
* Position the JSDF as a normal military force in the 
Constitution. 
* Three Non-Nuclear Principles must be changed to permit 
nuclear powered vessel and submarines. 
C. NEW FEATURE OF THE JMSDF 
In order to improve the maritime defense capability under the 
circumstances described above, I will examine the feature and the 
costs of an alternative force structure of JMSDF. 
84 
1. Physical Feature of an Alternative Maritime Force Structure 
a. Ship Assets 
TYPE NUMBER STDTON CREW 
SUBMARINE SSBN 4 8,000 100 
SS 12 4,000 60 
CARRIER DDV 2 15,000 300 
DESTROYER DDH 4 5,000 180 
DDG 8 7,000 180 
DD 20 5,000 150 
DD 30 3,000 130 
MINE MST 4 8,000 120 
MSO 6 1,500 60 
MSC 45 550 40 
AMPHIBIOUS LST 4 8,000 100 
LST 6 4,000 60 
SUPPORT AOE 4 10,000 100 
ATF 2 8,000 100 
ASR 2 3,500 100 
ATSS 2 4,000 30 
ATS 2 3,000 100 
AOS 4 3,000 100 
AGS 4 3,000 50 
ARC 2 5,000 100 
ASE 2 4,000 50 
AGB 1 10,000 100 
|TV 3 4,000 130 
Table 5  New Feature of Ship Asset 
b. Aircraft Assets 
TYPE NUMBER CLUE 
FTR VFA 40 1 
ASW VP 60 10 
SH 100 3 
EW EP 6 10 
MCM MH 12 7 
OTHERS 
TPT VC 8 4 
RESQ US 7 10 
RESQ UH 21 3 
MULTI UP 4 5 
TRG - 80 2 
Table 6  New Feature of Aircraft Asset 
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2. Fleet Comparison 
Figure 34 shows the comparison of fleet composition with 
displacement tons in natural logarithms. The new feature represents 










■   # "V   »i 
SSBN 
M/W "v'V    V_«'    .      » SB 
DD.FF 'CRUBffi DD.FF 'CRUSffi 
Figure 34 
Comparison of Fleet Composition (Ton)   (Natural Log) 
D. COST ESTIMATION OF BASE LINE FORCE STRUCTURE 
This section estimates the costs of the base line force structure 
if the JMSDF were to continue the same defense policy at the same 
composition levels into the early 21st century. I will consider time 
between FY2010-2020 as a period of estimation. 
1. Ship Assets 
Table 7 shows the estimated cost of ship assets. This table is 
calculated based upon Appendix AE and Appendix AF 
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Requirement Estimated Price Total Price 
SS 16 12 12 73,778,657 885,343,885 
DDH 4 2 2 111,677,445 223,354,891 
DDG 8 3 3 234,534,151 703,602,454 
DD 20 9 9 108,149,242 973,343,177 
DD (*DE) 30 16 16 81.054,702 1,296,875,226 
MST 4 0 0 - - 
MSO 6 3 3 46,735.466 140,206,398 
MSC 33 10 10 9.805,065 98,050,653 
LST 4 0 0 - - 
LST 2 2 2 19,040,702 38,081,403 
AOE 4 3 3 30,217,951 90,653,853 
ASR 2 1 1 3,343,452 3,343,452 
ATS 2 1 1 37,512,094 37,512,094 
AOS 2 0 0 - - 
AGS 4 2 2 17,461,435 34,922,870 
ARC 1 1 1 43,585,981 43,585,981 
ASE 2 1 1 51,693,799 51,693,799 
AGB 1 1 1 - - 
TV 3 1 1 63,635,271 63,635,271 
TOTAL 4,684.205,406 
Note: AGB is built by the budget of Education Agency. 
Table 7   Cost Estimation of Ship Asset (Baseline) 
2. Aircraft Assets 
Table 8 shows the estimated cost of aircraft assts.   This table is 
calculated based upon Appendix AG and Appendix AH. 











Estimated Price Total Price 
VP 80 41 41 24,939,277 1,022,510,369 
SH 100 24 24 10,362,632 248,703,158 
EP 5 5 5 25,828,731 129,143,657 
MH 11 6 6 13,415,135 80,490,808 
VC 4 0 0 9,255,173 0 
US 7 3 3 15,474,666 46,423,997 
UH 21 8 8 7,884,388 63,075,107 
UP 2 2 2 30,528,119 61,056,239 
TRG. etc 80 55 55 68,418,916 
TOTAL 310 144 144 1.719,822,250 
Table 8  Cost Estimation of Aircraft Assets (Baseline) 
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3. Total 
The total estimated budget is calculated as follows; 
a. Personnel and Provisions 
( Unit: Constant 1000 Yen in 1985 year Yen) 












329,059,411 7,074       13,846        3.1 46,085      638,092,910      6,380,929,100 
Note: Escalation Rate Is a average between 1985 and 1993 and calculated from Appendix Z(see Appendix AI). 
Number of personnel in 2015 (45,085) is estimated to be same as that In 1994. 
Table 9   Personnel and Provisions Expense (2010-2020) 
b. Front Line 
(1) Ship Asset : 4,684,205,407 (1000 Yen) 
(2) Aircraft Asset : 1,719,822,250 (1000 Yen) 
(3) Ammunition 











41 097,536|     9.2     |      284,914,026| 2,849 140T256 
Note: Escalation Kate is a average between 1985 and 1993 and calculated lrom Appendix 
Z(see Appendix AI). 













331,655,0621     7.1      |   1,499,874,732|    14,998,747,321 
Note: Escalation Rate is a average between 1985 and 1993 and calculated from Appendix 
Z(see Appendix AI). 
Table 11   Other Expense (2010-2020) 
d. Total 
(Unit:  Constant 1000 Yen in 1985 year Yen) 
Expenses Relevant Table 
Ship Assets 4,684,205,407 Table 11 
Aircraft Assets 1,719,822,250 Table 12 
Personnel & Provisions 6,380,929,100 Table 13 
Ammunitions 2,849,140,256 Table 14 
Others 14,998,747,321 Table 15 
Total 30,532,845,336 
Table 12   Estimate of Total Expenses(2010~2020) 
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E. COST ESTIMATION OF ALTERNATIVE FORCE STRUCTURE 
1. Personnel Composition 
Personnel composition of the new feature are estimated as 
follows; 
a. On Board Members 
Table 13 shows the estimates of total crew number on 
board.   Estimation is based upon current manning level and the recent 
trend of crew automation.   New crew size for the period considered is 







SUBMARINE SSBN 4 100 400 
ss 12 60 720 
CARRIER DDV 2 300 600 
DESTROYER DDH 4 180 720 
DDG 8 180 1,440 
DD 20 150 3,000 
DD 30 130 3,900 
MINE MST 4 120 480 
MSO 6 60 360 
MSC 45 40 1,800 
AMPHIBIOUS LST 4 100 400 
LST 6 60 360 
SUPPORT AOE 4 100 400 
ATF 2 100 200 
ASR 2 100 200 
ATSS 2 30 60 
ATS 2 100 200 
AOS 4 100 400 
AGS 4 50 200 
ARC 2 100 200 
ASE 2 50 100 
AGB 1 100 100 
TV 3 130 390 
OTHERS 3,000 
TOTAL 19,630 
Table 13   Estimation of On Board Personnel 
b. Aviation Members 
(1) Crew. Table 14 shows the estimated 
requirements of total numbers for aviation crews. Air crew manning 
estimation is assumed as the same as the current level. 
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TYPE NUMBÜU CREW Coeffl. TOTAL 
MEMBER 
FFR VFA 40 1 2.0 80 
ASW VP 60 10 1.5 900 
SH 100 3 2.0 600 
EW EP 6 10 1.5 90 
MCM MH 12 7 2.0 168 
OTHERS 
TFT Vc 8 4 1.2 38 
RESQ US 7 10 1.5 105 
RESQ UH 21 3 2.0 126 
MULTI UP 4 5 1.5 30 
TRG - 80 2 1.5 195 
TOTAL 2.332 
Table 14  Estimation of Aviation Crew Personnel 
(2) Maintenance. Table 15 shows the estimated 
requirements of the total number of aviation maintenance personnel. 
Maintenance manning estimation is assumed as the same as the 
current level. 
TWE NUMBER Coetil. TOTAL MEMBER 
FTR VFA 40 15 600 
ASW VP 60 20 1,200 
SH 100 14 1,400 
EW EP 6 20 120 
MCM MH 12 14 168 
OTHERS 
- - - 
TPT VC 8 20 160 
RESQ US 7 20 140 
RESQ UH 21 14 294 
MULTI UP 4 20 80 
TRG - 80 5 400 
TOTAL 4.487 
Table 15  Estimation of Aviation Maintenance Personnel 
(3) Others.   Head Quarter, etc. :5,000 
(This number is base upon the current level.) 
c. Total Member 
Table 16 shows the estimated total manpower level for an 
alternative force structure. Manpower level of 'ON SHORE', 


















Table 16 Total Manpower Level of an Alternative Force Structure 
From this  computation,  the  estimated total manpower 
requirement of JMSDF are calculated to be almost the same as the 
current level(46,085 in 1994). 
2. Financial Evaluation 
In Chapter III and IV, the trend of defense expenditures and 
ship and aircraft expansion and their cost were illustrated. Taking 
these trends into account, the financial impact of the new features of 
JMSDF are calculated. 
a. Ship Assets 
Using FY2010 ~ 2020 as the period of evaluation (see 
Appendix AE), necessary estimates and cost calculation are shown in 
following table (see Appendix AF). 
Comparing this table with table 7(Cost estimation of the 
alternative structure), estimated cost of an alternative structure will 
increase by 61.3% (i.e. (7,556,233,582 - 4,684,205,408) /4,684,205, 
408 = 0.6131). 
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SSBN 4 0 4 400,646,244 1,602,584,976 
SS 12 16 12 8 73,778,657 590,229,257 
DDV 2 0 2 242,469,243 484,938,486 
DDH 4 4 2 2 111,677,445 223,354,891 
DDG 8 8 3 5 234,534,151 1,172,670,757 
DD 20 20 9 9 108,149,242 973,343,177 
DD (*DE) 30 30 16 16 81,054,702 1,296,875,226 
MST 4 4 0 0 - - 
MSO 6 6 3 3 46,735,466 140,206,398 
MSC 45 33 10 22 9,805,065 215,711,437 
LST 4 4 0 0 - - 
LST 6 2 2 6 19,040,702 114,244,210 
AOE 4 4 3 3 30,217,951 90,653,853 
ATF 2 0 2 91,590,506 183,181,011 
ASR 2 2 1 1 62,735,355 62,735,355 
ATSS 2 0 2 34,304,960 68,609,919 
ATS 2 2 1 1 37,512,094 37,512,094 
AOS 4 2 0 2 30,979,316 61,958,632 
AGS 4 4 2 2 17,461,435 34,922,870 
ARC 2 1 1 2 43,585,981 87,171,962 
ASE 2 2 1 1 51,693,799 51,693,799 
AGB 1 1 1 1 - - 
TV 3 3 1 1 63,635,271 63,635,271 
TOTAL 7,S56,233,582 
Note : AGB is built by the budget of Education Agency. 
Table 17   Cost Estimation of Ship Assets 
b. Aircraft Assets 
Using FY2010 ~ 2020 as the period of evaluation(see 
Appendix AG), necessary estimates and its cost calculation are shown 
in following table (see Appendix AH). 
Comparing this table with Table 8(Cost estimation of the 
alternative structure), the estimated cost of an alternative structure 
will increase by 3.3%(i.e.(1,776,642,085 - 1,719,822,250 / 1,719,82 
2,250 = 0.0331). 
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VFA 40 0 40 10,070,248 402,809,919 
VP 60 80 41 21 24,939,277 523,724,823 
SH 100 100 24 24 10,362,632 248,703,158 
EP 6 5 5 6 25,828,731 154,972,388 
MH 12 11 6 7 13,415,135 93,905,942 
VC 8 4 0 4 9,255,173 37,020,691 
US 7 7 3 4 15,474,666 61,898,662 
UH 21 21 8 8 7,884,388 63,075,107 
UP 4 2 2 4 30,528,119 122,112,477 
TRG. etc 80 80 55 55 68,418,916 
TOTAL 338 310 144 173 1,776,642,085 
Table 18  Cost Estimation of Aircraft Assets 
c Personnel and Provisions 
Table 19 shows the cost estimation of personnel & 
provisions. This table was made using estimated number of personnel 
instead of using number of personnel in 1994. 
( Unit: Constant 1000 Yen in 1985 year Yen) 












329.059.411 7,074       13,846|       3.1        |        46,449|     643,134,214|     6,431,342,144 
Note: Escalation Rate Is a average between 1985 and 1993 and calculated lrom appendix Z(see Appendix Al). 
Table 19   Personnel and Provisions Expense (2010-2020) 
d. Front Line 
These costs were calculated in the same way as the base 
line structure and cost of ammunitions was assumed to be the same. 
(1) Ship Asset : 7,5556,233,582 (1000 Yen) 

















Note: Escalation Rate is a average between 1985 and 1993 and calculated from Appendix 
Z(see Appendix AI). 
Table 20  Ammunition Expense (2010-2020) 
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e. Others 
These costs were calculated in the same manner as the 
base line structure. 
(Unit:  Constant 1000 Yen In 1985 year Yen) 
1993 BUÖ6ET 
(Real) 









1,499,874,732     14,998,747,321 
Note: Escalation Rate Is a average between 1985 and 1993 and calculated lrom Appendix 
Z(see Appendix AI). 
Table 21   Other Expense (2010-2020) 
/.Total 
(Unit:  Constant 1000 Yen In 1985 year Yen) 
Expenses Relevant Table 
Ship Assets 7,556,233,582 Table 17 
Aircraft Assets 1,776,642,085 Table 18 
Personnel & Provisions 6,431,342,144 Table 19 
Ammunitions 2,849,140,256 Table 20 
Others 14,998,747,321 Table 21 
Total 33,612,105,389 
Table 22   Estimate of Total Expenses(2010-2020) 
From Table 22, an annualized average of 3,361,200 million 
Yen is  calculated to accomplish the new alternative  structure  of 
JMSDF. 
F. COMPARISON OF TOTAL COSTS 
1. Ship Assets 
Table 23 shows the difference in ship costs for the two force 
structures. From this Table, it is apparent that almost 70% of 
increased costs are related to the buildup of SSBN and DDV (Right 
class CV that operates VFA). 
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(Unit Constant 1000 Yen In 198E > year Yen) 
TYPE TOTAL PRICE 
Baseline Alternative Difference % 
SSBN 0 1,602,584,976 1,602,584,976 55.8% 
SS 885,343,885 590,229,257 -295,114,628 -10.3% 
DDV 0 484,938,486 484,938,486 16.9% 
DDH 223,354,891 223,354,891 0 0.0% 
DDG 703,602,454 1,172,670,757 469,068,303 16.3% 
DD 973,343,177 973,343,177 0 0.0% 
DD (*DE) 1,296,875,226 1,296,875,226 0 0.0% 
MST - - - - 
MSO 140,206,398 140,206,398 0 0.0% 
MSC 98,050,653 215,711,437 117,660.784 4.1% 
LST - - - - 
LST 38,081,403 114,244,210 76,162,807 2.7% 
AOE 90,653,853 90,653,853 0 0.0% 
ATF 0 183,181,011 183,181,011 6.4% 
ASR 3,343,452 62,735,355 59,391,903 2.1% 
ATSS 0 68,609,919 68,609,919 2.4% 
ATS 37,512,094 37,512,094 0 0.0% 
AOS 0 61,958,632 61,958,632 2.2% 
AGS 34,922,870 34,922,870 0 0.0% 
ARC 43,585,981 87,171,962 43,585,981 1.5% 
ASE 51,693,799 51,693,799 0 0.0% 
AGB - - - - 
TV 63,635,271 63,635,271 0 0.0% 
TOTAL 4,684,205,407 7,556,233,581 2,872,028,174 
Table 23  Comparison of Total Costs of Ship Assets 
2. Aircraft Assets 
Table 24 shows the difference in aircraft costs for the two 
structures. From this table, it is clear that the increased procurement 
cost of VFA is almost offset by the reduction of the procurement cost 
of VP aircraft. This trade off minimizes the cost difference between 
the two force structure for the aircraft. 
95 
(Unit: Constant 1000 Yen In 1985 year Yen) 
TYPE TOTAL PRICE 
Baseline Alternative Difference % 
VFA 0 402,809,919 402,809,919 708.9% 
VP 1,022,510,369 523,724,823 -498,785,546 -877.8% 
248,703,158 248,703,158 0 0.0% 
129,143,657 154,972,388 25,828,731 45.5% 
80,490,808 93,905,942 13,415,134 23.6% 
CV 0 37,020,691 37,020,691 65.2% 
US 46,423,997 61,898,662 15,474,665 27.2% 
63,075,107 63,075,107 0 0.0% 
UP 61,056,239 122,112,477 61,056,238 107.5% 
. etc. 68,418,916 68,418,916 0 0.0% 
TOTAL 1,719,822,250 1,776,642,085 56,819,830 
Table 24  Comparison of Total Costs of Aircraft 
3. Total 
Table 25 shows the comparison of total costs of 'Baseline' and 
'Alternative'. From this table the cost of alternative force structure 
increases by 9.73% compared with baseline structure (i.e. (33,612,10 
5,388 - 30,632,844,334) / 30,632,844,334 = 0.0973). A noticeable 
increase of 96.4% is indicated and is due to the increased cost of the 
ship assets. Approximately 70% of the increased cost of ship assets 
were based upon the increased buildup of SSBN and DDV. 
(Unit: Constant 1000 Yen In 1985 year Yen) 
TOTAL PRICE 
Baseline Alternative Difference % 
Ship Assets 4,684,205,407 7,556,233,582 2,872,028,175 96.4% 
Aircraft Assets 1,719,822,250 1,776,642,085 56,819.835 1.9% 
Personnel & Provisions 6,380,929,100 6,431,342,144 50,413,044 1.7% 
Ammunitions 2,849,140,256 2,849,140,256 0 0.0% 
Others 14,998,747,321 14,998,747,321 0 0.0% 
Total 30,632,844,334 33,612,105,388 2,979,261,054 
Table 25  Comparison of Total Costs 
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G. BUDGET ESTIMATION 
From Chapter IV, it was observed that the JMSDF budget 
remained about 25 % of the Defense Expenditures for last 20 years. If 
a similar budget composition continues, then the total JSDF budget 
will be around 13.44 trillion Yen(i.e. 3.36 * 4 = 13.44 trillion). Table 
26 shows the estimation of the JMSDF budget. For the computation of 
this table, a real GNP growth rate of 3.6% (average between 1985 and 
1993) is used for the period of 1995~2020(see Appendix AI). 
From this table, the annualized average real GNP will become 
930.38 trillion Yen for 2010-2020. This amounts to an annualized 
average JMSDF budget of 2.28 trillion Yen for the same period. This is 
less than the required expenditure (3.36 trillion Yen) to implement 
the alternative force structure. Required defense expenditures 
becomes 1.44 % of GNP (i.e. 13.44/930.38=0.0144). This figure 
exceeds the current level of defense expenditure. 
With respect to budget requirements, the baseline structure 
becomes 1.32% of GNP (i.e. 3.06*4/930.38=0.0132). This figure is 
calculated mainly from the difference of escalation rate between GNP 
and total assets. As long as economic conditions and the increasing 
rate of costs continue at current level, the JSDF will encounter budget 
problems regardless if the JSDF maintains its current baseline force 
structure. 
As a result, the increase of cost for an alternative force structure 
shows only 0.12% of GNP (i.e. 0.0144-0.0132=0.0012). This amount 
is possible and not surprising . 
Table 27 shows the Defense Expenditure of other countries. In 
comparison with other countries, the new share rate is reasonable. 
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(Unlt:ConstantlOA8 Yen In 1985 year Yen) 
Fiscal Year Real GNP 
Defense Expenditure JMSDF BUDGET 
DE/GNP=0.979% 
(AVE.('85-'93)) 
25 % Of GNP 
1994 4,399,389 43,070 10,768 
1995 4,557,766 44,621 11,155 
1996 4,721,846 46,227 11,557 
1997 4,891,833 47,891 11,973 
1998 5,067,939 49,615 12,404 
1999 5,250,384 51,401 12,850 
2000 5,439,398 53,252 13,313 
2001 5,635,216 55,169 13,792 
2002 5,838,084 57,155 14,289 
2003 6,048,255 59,212 14,803 
2004 6,265,992 61,344 15,336 
2005 6,491,568 63,552 15,888 
2006 6,725,265 65,840 16,460 
2007 6,967,374 68,211 17,053 
2008 7,218,200 70,666 17,667 
2009 7,478,055 73,210 18,303 
2010 7,747,265 75,846 18,961 
2011 8,026,166 78,576 19,644 
2012 8,315,108 81,405 20,351 
2013 8,614,452 84,335 21,084 
2014 8,924,573 87,372 21,843 
2015 9,245,857 90,517 22,629 
2016 9,578,708 93,776 23,444 
2017 9,923,541 97,151 24,288 
2018 10,280,789 100,649 25,162 
2019 10,650,897 104,272 26,068 
2020 11,034,330 108,026 27,007 
AVE. (2010-2020) 9,303,790 91,084 22,771 













1 UNITED STATES 242,717 964 5.3 
2 RUSSIA 39,680 268 9.9 
3 CHINA 22,364 19 5.0 
4 FRANCE 21,898 385 3.4 
5 UNITED KINGDOM 20,726 366 4.0 
6 GERMANY 19,252 251 2.4 
7 JAPAN 16,901 136 1.0 
8 SAUDI ARABIA 14,535 1,371 11.8 
9 ITALY 10,690 186 2.0 
10 KUWAIT 10,185 5,000 62.4 
11 CANADA 7,790 288 2.0 
12 INDIA 7,550 9 2.5 
13 SOUTH KOREA 7,189 160 3.8 
14 TAIWAN 5,373 253 4.8 
15 NORTH KOREA 5,087 214 25.7 
16 AUSTRALIA 4,335 254 2.4 
17 CROATIA 4,330 913 24.1 
18 UKRAINE 4,320 82 3.8 
19 UA.E 4,249 2,418 14.6 
20 ISRAEL 3,984 783 11.1 
Source: 
Table 27   Defense 
The Military Balance   1993-1994 
Expenditure of High-Ranking Countries(1992) 
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vn. CONCLUSION 
As I stated at the outset, the primary research question was 
"Should the force structure of JMSDF in the early 21st century remain 
the same as it has been in the last 10 years?" 
To answer this question, I made a brief country analysis of Japan 
and her neighboring countries in terms of their politics, diplomacy, 
economy and military. The neighboring countries analyzed included 
China, North and South Korea, Russia and the U.S. This analysis was 
followed by future prospect for these countries in the early 21st 
century in terms of the same four variables. Based upon the above 
country analysis, I developed a series of hypothetical threat scenarios 
and examined them in terms of their likelihood, degree of threat and 
propriety of facing the threat. 
Changed Paradigm 
Japan faces a more vexing situation in its dealing with her 
neighbor and the U.S. in this post Cold-War era. During Cold-War, the 
U.S. and Japan faced a common threat of expanding communism and 
formed a strong security arrangement. In particular, the U.S. Naval 
Forces Pacific and JMSDF comprised a complementary force 
structure. However, with the disappearance of such clear common 
interests, the physical complementarity of the two forces could no 
longer by itself shape and bond security relations. Although there is 
no clear evidence that the U.S. will depart from Japan, it may not be 
possible to secure the same level of U.S. commitment to the security 
of Japan. 
Japanese Public Apathy 
When the Japanese public continues to remain reluctant over 
any overseas military undertakings, Japan's ability to respond as an ally 
to the U.S. and as a responsible member of the international 
community will be diminished. Another repeat of Gulf-episode could 
hasten the rethinking of the U.S. security commitment to Japan. 
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Emergence of Regional Power 
Looking into the early 21st century, we see many changes in the 
geo-political equation in North East Asia. For example, the emergence 
of China as a superpower and the unification of Korea seem 
increasingly likely in the coming period. Moreover, as many 
countries, with their increased national power, insist on mutually 
conflicting territorial claims around the vital sealanes in Asia, Japan 
faces more a difficult and complicated security picture. 
Need for New Force Structure 
A combination of analyses suggests that JMSDF should seek a 
force structure more appropriate for the post Cold-War period. The 
structure developed in the last 10 years is the result of the special 
Japan-U.S. relationship forged during the Cold-War when the U.S. Navy 
provided key support for the JMSDF operation. With the 
disappearance of a clear-cut common threat from Communism and the 
downsizing of the U.S. Navy, Japan may not be able to count on the 
same level of support and commitment from the U.S. Navy. This may 
be especially true as the threat becomes more regionalized and where 
clear U.S. interests are not involved. All of this suggest that JMSDF 
should develop a more balanced and independent force structure even 
if its mission remains the same as before. This may require some 
revision of current legal limitations and increased defense expenses. 
Japan should undertake this correction not only for her own security 
needs, but also to make a more equal contribution to ensure the 
Japan-U.S. Security arrangement viable in the coming decade. 
A Hypothetical Alternative Force Structure 
An alternative JMSDF force structure is constructed in Chapter 
VI that achieves a more balanced ship and aircraft mix. This 
alternative is clearly only one of many possibilities and developed 
mainly as a feasibility exercise. The costs and manpower 
requirements for the alternative are estimated taking into account 
recent JMDF costs and manpower experience.    The result suggests 
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that even though it may cost more than the base case, the alternative 
is certainly feasible without much sacrifice to the Japanese national 
economy. 
The manpower requirement for this alternative is similar to the 
baseline structure, the cost is expected to be 9.73% higher than the 
baseline. However, the level is still only 1.44% of GNP suggesting that 
this alternative is certainly within the reach of Japanese economy. 
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APPENDIX A. GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (1981-1991) 
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APPENDIX Q. TREND OF MILITARY FORCE 
OF COUNTRIES AROUND JAPAN 
Country Force 1985 ■>986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 I  1994 
U.S. 
Seventh Fleet I 
Total Numoer 70 70 70 70 70 70 60 60 60 60 
Total Ton(milion) 70 70 70 70 70 70 65 65 65 65 
Air Cratt 230 230 230 230 230 200 130 140 140 140 
In Korea 
Divisions 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total Numoer(milion| 3 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3 2.6 2.6 
Air Craft 100 100 100 100 100 110 90 90 80 80 
In Japan 
Divisions 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total Numoer(milion) 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.6 




Divisions 41 41 43 43 43 41 38 36 33 27 
Total Number(milion) 37 27 39 39 39 36 34 32 29 24 
Naval Vessels 
Total Number 835 840 840 845 840 830 820 780 760 745 
Total Ton(milion) 178 185 185 190 190 194 212 207 192 L     189 
Air Force 
Cmbat Alrcratt 2200 2390 2390 2430 2430 2240 2060 1860 1430 1220 
China 
Ground Force 
Divisions 135 135 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 100 
Total Numoer(milion) 316 297 211 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 
Naval Vessels 
Total Number 1740 1730 1870 2000 1980 2060 2010 1910 1060 1080 
Total Ton(milion) 91.4 87.7 9B.3 94.6 94.5 100 98 98 91 95 
Air Force 
Cmbat Aircraft 6010 6100 6200 6200 6000 6050 6060 6140 6170 6160 
South 
Korea 
Ground Force I 
Divisions 22 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 22 22 
Total Numoer(milion) 54 52 52 54.2 54.2 55 55 55 55 55 
Naval Vessels 
Total Number 140 150 160 160 170 180 180 180 220 230 
Total Ton(milion) 9.9 9 1 1 10.4 11.3 11.4 11.6 1 1 12.8 1 4 
Marine (milion) 2 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Air Force 




Divisions 39 33 33 32 26|         31 25 25 30 26 
Total Number(milion) 70 75 75 75 75)         93 93 93 100 113 
Naval Vessels 
Total Numoer 500 510 520 510 52o|      590 590 620 620 620 
Total Ton(milion) 6.8 7 7.2 6.6 7.1 7.4 7.3 8.1 8.8 8.5 
Air Force 
Cmbat Aircraft 740 700 750 740 770j      770 790 800 810 310 I 
Note :   1   Data avairable from 'Military Balance'etc. 
2  Combat aircraft include navy ana marine corps aircraft. 
Source :   Defense of Japan 1985-1994 (Japan Defense Agency) 
126 
APPENDIX R. BASIC POLICY FOR JAPAN'S NATIONAL DEFENSE 
The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and 
indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such action, thereby 
preserving the independence and peace of Japan founded upon 
democratic principles. 
To achieve this objective, the government of Japan hereby 
establishes the following principles: 
1 To support the activities of the United Nations and promote 
international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of 
world peace. 
2. To promote public welfare and enhance the people's love for 
the country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's 
security. 
3 To develop progressively the effective defense capabilities 
necessary for self-defense, with regard to the nation's resources and 
the prevailing domestic situation. 
4. To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan- 
U.S. security arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the 
United States in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression. 
Source : Defense of Japan (Defense Agency, Japan) 
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APPENDIX S. OUTLINE OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE 
BUILDUP FOR THE FUTURE 
1. First of all, Japan will stick steadfastly to its exclusive defense 
policy under the peace constitution. At the same time, Japan, holding 
fast to the Japan-U.S., Security Arrangements, will continue 
maintaining the basic defense policy it has pursued over the past 
years, including the moderate improvement of its defense capability. 
2. The defense-related expenditure for each fiscal year during the 
enforcement period of the Mid-Term Defense Program is decided 
within the framework of required expenses set forth in this program. 
And the total amount of expenses is set the actual ceiling of defense 
expenditure for the five years of the program that was scheduled to be 
prepared anew three years henceforth. 
3. As regards defense-related expenditures in and after fiscal 1991, 
it will be decided, by the time in the Mid-Term Defense program is 
completed, in accordance with Japan's basic policy as a peace-loving 
nation by taking into consideration factors such as the international 
situation, and economic and fiscal situation. 
4. Furthermore, considering that the decision on "Defense Buildup 
for the Time Being" in 1976 has so far played a vital role as a guideline 
for the defense buildup expenses, the government, with this well in 
mind, will continue holding in high esteem the spirit of the decision 
calling for a moderate defense buildup. 
Source : Summary of Defense of Japan 1988 (Defense Agency, Japan) 
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APPENDIX T. CHANGE IN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 





























































































































































































































FY 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Defence (DE) 41.593 43,860 45,518 46.406 46.835 
GNP 4.172,000 4.596.000 4,837,000 4,953.000 4,940,000 
BUDGET 662,368 703.474 722,180 723,548 730,817 
Ratio(%) 
(DDE/GNP 0.997% 0.954% 0.941% 0.937%= 0.948% 
(2)DE/BUGET 6.28%= 6.23% 6.30% 6.41% 6.41 % 
Source: BOUEI HANDBOOK (Asagumo  Shinbunsya) 
note: 1. BUDGET  is shown by Original Budget. 
2 GNP is Shown by Initial forecasted GNP. 
3'. Defense Expenditure and Budget of FY1994 are Gevernment Plan 
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APPENDIX AA. JMSDF SHIPBUILDING COST (BY TYPE) 
FY 








FY1961 KITAKAMI 7,420,057 4,980 6.88E-08 
1967 CHKUGO 7,955,372 5,412 4.72E-08 
1977 ISHIKARI 14,068,471 10,906 4.99E-08 
1979 YUUBARI 16,396,047 11,154 4.59E-08 
1986 ABUKUMA 23,609,808 11,805 3.58E-08 
DD 
FY1962 YAMAGUMO 10,110,612 4,932 6.87E-08 
1963 TAKATSUKI 14,242,918 4,594 5.82E-08 
1977 HATSUYUKI 32,894,496 11,151 5.23E-08 
1983 ASAGIRI 40,359,168 11,531 4.08E-08 
1991 HARUSAME 54,485,316 12,383 2.69E-08 
DDG 
FY1960 AMATSUKAZE 14,215,567 4,661 7.90E-08 
1971 TACHIKAZE 31,198,660 8,104 5.80E-08 
1981 HATAKAZE 62,670,571 13,624 5.11E-08 
1988 KONGOU 113,380,204 15,747 4.48E-08 
SS 
FY1960 HAYASHIO 6,674,718 8,449 1.37E-07 
1963 OOSHIO 12,367,682 7,496 9.40E-08 
1967 UZUSHIO 15,479,852 8,367 7.23E-08 
1975 YUUSHIO 28,987,971 13,176 7.08E-08 
1986 HAMASHIO 31,724,905 14,100 5.25E-08 
Source : Kaijoujieitai Yosan Jimuteiyou  (Kaijoubakuryoukanbu) 
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APPENDIX AC. JMSDF AIRCRAFT PROCURING COST (BY TYPE) 
(1000  Yen) 
FY AIRCRAFT NOMINAL COST REALCOST 
-1985 
Helicopter 
1962 HSS-2 345,899 1,114,834 
1979 HSS-2B 2,549,259 2,747,406 
1988 SH-60J 4,700,461 4,343,711 
Fixed Winq 
1962 P2V-7 679,153 2,190,154 
1967 P-2J 1,444,425 3,489,953 
1978 P-3C 7,486,908 8,166,289 
Source : Kaijoujieitai Yosan Jimuteiyou   (Kaijoubakuryoukanbu) 
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APPENDIX AF. TREND .AND ESTIMATE OF SHIPBUILDING COST (1/7) 
SS (Real Value : 1000 Yen) 






WAKASHIO 6,606,476 0.000 
0.003 NATSUSHIO 6,674,718 0.010 






OOSHIO 12.058,401 0.807 0.825 
ASASHIO 12,367,682 0.026 
-0.021 HARUSHIO 11,620,773 -0.060 
MICHISHIO 11,003,653 -0.053 








UZUSHIO 15,479,852 0.402 0.284 
MAKISHIO 14,194,970 -0.083 
0.064 
ISOSHIO 14,740,710 0.038 
NARUSHIO 14,571,088 -0.012 
KUROSHIO 13,774,589 -0.055 
TAKASHIO 13,949,194 0.013 











YUUSHIO 28,987,971 0.400 0.873 
MOCHISHIO 29,315,454 0.011 
0.008 
SETOSHIO 29,175,424 -0.005 
OKISHIO 27,925,058 -0.043 
NADASHIO 31,173,098 0.116 
HAMASHIO 31,724,905 0.018 
AKISHIO 32,545,862 0.026 
TAKESHIO 29,200,966 -0.103 
YUK1SHIO 29,739,792 0.018 









HARUSHIO 37,402,606 0.218 1.290 
NATSUSHIO 35,477,370 -0.051 
0.036 
HAYASHIO 35,339,722 -0.004 
ARASHIO 35,819.834 0.014 
WAKASHIO 35,975,840 0.004 
HUYUSHIO 35,479,683 -0.014 
04SS 39,879.149 0.124 
05SS 47,013.403 0.179 
AVERAGE 0.075 0.818 0.018 
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APPENDIX AF. TREND .AND ESTIMATE OF SHIPBUILDING COST (2/7) 
DD 
Fiscal Year NAME REAL VALUE UP RATE 











MAKIGUMO 10,953,853 0.083 
0.082 
ASAGUMO 10,154,748 -0.073 
MINEGUMO 11,023,913 0.086 
NATSUGUMO 10,955,084 -0.006 
MURAKUMO 11,051,293 0.009 
AOKUMO 11,206,156 0.014 
ASAGUMO 11,025,293 -0.016 





TAKATSUKI 14,242,918 0.409 
KIKUZUKI 17,934,419 0.259 
0.1 1 1 MOCHIZUKI 18,380,248 0.025 







HATSUYUKI '  32,894,496 1.310 
SHIRAYUKI 30,735,065 -0.066 
0.031 
MINEYUKIetc(3) 32,921,674 0.071 
ISOYUKIetc(2) 33,277,788 0.011 
YAMAYUKIetc(2) 34,437,168 0.035 





ASGIRI 40,359,168 0.227 
YAMAGIRIetc(3) 37,258,776 -0.077 
-0.013 HAMAGIRIetc(3) 38,995,939 0.047 
UMK3IRI 38,674.024 -0.008 
1991 
1992 
HARUSAME 54,485,316 0.350 
04DD 58,593,396 0.075 0.075 






















































APPENDIX AF. TREND .AND ESTIMATE OF SHIPBUILDING COST (3/7) 
DDH 




HO 20,746,106 0.010 0.010 
1975 
1976 
SHIRANE 47.666,371 1.322 
KURAMA 48.869,649 0.025 0.025 
AVERAGE 0.018 1.322 0.018 
MSC 













NINOSHIMA 5.234,636 -0.027 
-0.005 
ENOSHIMA 4.627.083 -0.116 
OOSHIMA 4,583,425 -0.009 
YAKUSHIMA 4,586,628 0.001 
HAHAJIMA 4,723.656 0.030 
NUWAJIMA 4.610,432 -0.024 
KAMISHIMA 4,441.814 -0.037 
OGISHIMA 4,755.414 0.071 
YURISHIMA 4,739,064 -0.003 




UWAJIMA 6,338,990 0.179 
TSUKISHIMA 6,484,507 0.023 
0.055 MAEJIMA 7,046,032 0.087 
AVERAGE 0.005 0.179 0.025 
MSO 




0.055 HACHIJYOU 15.996,747 0.055 0.055 
LST 





MOTOBU 3.809,858 -0.099 




MIURA 6.164.231 0.458 
OJIKA 4.991.647 -0.190 
-0.059 SATSUMA 5,349.459 0.072 
AVERAGE -0.018 0.458 -0.018 
1993 05LST 45,328,886 6.354 6.354 
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APPENDIX AF. TREND .AND ESTIMATE OF SHIPBUILDING COST (4/7) 
AOE 
Fiscal Year NAME REAL VALUE UP RATE AVE. UP RATE 
1976 SAGAMI 15,316,700 
1984 
1987 
TOWADA 18,901,620 0.234 
0.036 TOKIWA (2) 19,575,901 0.036 








UP RATE AVE. UP RATE 
ATS 
Fiscal Year NAME REAL VALUE UP RATE AVE. UP RATE 
1967 AZUMA •- 4,617,798 | 
1986 KUROBE 
- 14,300,585 2.097J 2.097 
AOS 
Fiscal Year NAME REAL VALUE UP RATE AVE. UP RATE 
1989 HIBIKI 13,590.775 




Fiscal Year NAME REAL VALUE UP RATE AVE. UP RATE 
1967 AKASHI 2.848,478 
1979 SUMA 5,523,701 0.939 
1976 
1983 
HUTAMI 9,401,465 0.702 
WAKASA 9,044,673 -0.038 
-0.038 
AVERAGE 








UP RATE AVE. UP RATE 
ASE 
Fiscal Year NAME REAL VALUE UP RATE AVE. UP RATE 
1992 ASUKA 25,079.872 
TY 
Fiscal Year NAME REAL VALUE UP RATE AVE. UP RATE 
1992 30,873,422 
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Note:    NoW93SSN(USA)*1.041A17 
Others: No.1*1.041A(n-1) 
93 SSN=1,903.2($M) 
1.041 is average of AVE. UP RATE 























Note:   No1='93LHD(USA)*1.041A17 















Others : No.1*1.057A(n-1) 
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1 5 10,560,099 
16 10,824,101 
17 11,094,704 








Others : No.1*1.025A(n-1) 
AOE 
Note: No1=YAEYAMA*1.055A20 















Note:  No1=TOWADA*1.25*1.234 







Others : No.T1.023A(n-1) 
Note:   NO1=05LST*1.041A17 
Others: No.1* 1.041A(n-1) 
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Note:  No1=ASUKA*1.041A18 
TV 
1 63,635,271 
Note:  No1 = 1992  TV*1.041A18 
Sourse : Kaijojieitai Yosan Jimuteiyo (Kaijobakuryokanbu) 
151 
Z9\ 
1° ] i     .    ■     1 1 "~ ""T"       : !   * 1 ! 1 j 1  , 1_ |      i      '      I    " ■     1 
n 1 I   '   ■ 
CM 1 1   ]   ! !   i 
1 
1    !    | 
'■ 1 i   1   1 !     i A i 1 !      ; 1 
n 1   ' 1     1 1 i      j 
CM ! 1    1    i ;   1 i 1 1 i      1 !      | 
o i 1 
CM 1 1 i 
£ |    i L ▲ I 
o j 
CM 1 1 1 
to A A i i 
O 1 i i 
- A 1 1 ra 
CM ! 
■V ▲ i 1 
o i i 
CM 1 ! | 
P> A 1     ! i ▲ 
o i | 
eg 1 
iv J j : ;        ! i j j A i A 
o 
CM 1 






O A 1 ! i      j ▲ i I A i j A 
O | 
CM : 1 : 1 ■ ! 
Ol 
o ▲J i i j | '■   j A j t L I A 
o 1 1 
CM ! • ! ! !   1 I : 
<x> 
o A ; i I | ▲ i !   lA ■ | 
o 1 
CM ' I i ! 1 ! 1 1  ' . 
O ▲ ] 1 i 1 ! A i I A | 
o i 1 
CM 1 1 1 1 ! 1 | 
CD 
O ▲ 1 ! i i ! A ; , j i 1 
O 1 | 
CM 
1 i 1       ! i ! 1 ; 
o A [ ; I !       I 1 1 A | i 
o | i 
CM i i 1 i 1 
A 1 i 1 i 1       1 1 . A \ i 1 ; I A 
O t !    i 1 \ i 
CM 1 i ! ' i    1 , i t 
O ▲ 1 ! ! i i    i ' i j ' , i A 1 1 
O 1 i 
CM ! 1 1 i ! i 1 i ' 1 
CM A j 1 i j i ;    [ ; ' 1 j i 
r> i 
CM 1 1 '    ! 1 1 ! 1 ' I 
o A i 1 ! I i 1 .    [ i i ! 1 1 ■ i j A i 
C3 1 I I I i 
CM 1 1 ! ! 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 ! I ! i t 
O | i 
o | | 1 
o | 1 
CM 
J.. ! I 1 1 ! ! ! ! ! 
m 
en 1 1 
01 | [ | | 
■^ 1 !    : 1 ! 1 i i < 
on 
CJ» 
O) | 1 i 
*~ j I 1 ! i 
CT) I i i ! l i | j ! ! 1 A 1 i 
Ol | 1 1 1 
*~ ! i ! ' 1 ! 
CO I i 
(7> 1 
Ol 1 i i ■ | i i 
— ! i 1 1 ! ! 
m 
o> I 
Ol i 1 
•" I i 1 1 1 ! 1 1 1 ■ 
n- ,- CM C*> •*r in CO r*. en <n o — CM tn ■v m CD   r^ o — <0 r^ o> Ol _ CM m-r m CO ^ ^ ^ 







i in m in r^ U> 00 o o <n 
1 
Ol 









v m CO •V CM "0- »- 
i 
< & 6b s i 3 
(S/T)  (030S-966I) 
MOTd ONIHIlOOtfd UVH0HIV AO 3XVWLLS3 'OV XIdN3ddV 
APPENDIX AG. ESTIMATE OF AIRCRAFT PROCURING FLOW 
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AV013 ONIHflOOHd 13VH0HIV dO 3XVIAHXS3 'OV XiaN3ddV 
APPENDIX AH. TREND.AND ESTIMATE OF AIRCRAFT 
PROCURING COST (1/4) 
VP (P-3C) (Real Value : 1000 Yen) 
Fiscal Year REALVALUE UP RATE 
1978 8,166,289 - 
1980 9,963,535 0.220 
1982 11,597,113 0.164 
1983 11,165,871 -0.037 
1984 11,076,263 -0.008 
1985 11,256,776 0.016 
1986 10,386,263 -0.077 
1987 9,372,614 -0.098 
1988 9,082,350 -0.031 
1989 8,841,221 -0.027 
1990 9,603,396 0.086 
1991 9,148,061 -0.047 
1992 10,562,543 0.155 





































































































































APPENDIX AH. TREND.AND ESTIMATE OF AIRCRAFT 
PROCURING COST (2/4) 
UP(UP-3) OH-6D 
Fiscal Year NOMINAL VALUE UP RATE 
1994 14,808,000 - 
1995 13,611,000 -0.081 
AVE. 14,209,500 -0.081 
T-5 
Fiscal Year REAL VALUE UP RATE 
1990 380,652 - 
1991 397,688 0.045 
1992 392,486 -0.013 




Fiscal Year REAL VALUE UP RATE 
1973 413,526 - 
1974 409,057 -0.011 
1977 478,080 0.169 
1978 469,515 -0.018 
1979 387,242 -0.175 
1980 420,635 0.086 
1981 457,303 0.087 
1982 531,867 0.163 
1983 593,269 0.115 
1984 602,406 0.015 
1986 585,912 -0.027 
1992 513,558 -0.123 
AVE. 0.026 
LC-90 
Fiscal Year REAL VALUE UP RATE 
1987 523,946 - 
1989 449,431 -0.142 
1990 495,558 0.103 
AVE. -0.020 
Fiscal Year REAL VALUE UP RATE 
1982 212,639 - 
1983 260,801 0.226 
1984 230,866 -0.115 
1987 227,771 -0.013 
1989 194,379 -0.147 
1992 228,344 0.175 
AVE. 0.025 
NP-3 
Fiscal Year REAL VALUE UP RATE 
1991 7,631,391 - 











Note: Negative up rates are ignored 
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APPENDIX AH  TREND.AND ESTIMATE OF AIRCRAFT 
PROCURING COST (3/4) 
PRICE ESTIMATION 
VP 

























Note:   No.1=EP-3(1993)-1.038*17 
Others=No.n.038A(n-1) 
Note:   No.1~9=P-3C(1993)*1.038*17 
Others=No.n.038A(n-1_) 
SH(SH-60J) MH(MH-53E) 
1- 4 13,247,335 
5- 6 13,750,734 
TOTAL 80,490,808 
AVE. 13,415,135 
Note:   No.1=MH-53E(1991)*1.038*25 
Others=No.1*1.038A(n-1) 








Note:   No.1=US-1A(1993)*1.038*22 
Others=No.n.038A(n-1) 
1- 2 7,411,741 
3- 4 7,693,387 





Note:   No.1~2=UH-60J(1993)*1.038*17 
Others=No.T1.038*(n-1) 
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APPENDIX AH. TREND.AND ESTIMATE OF AIRCRAFT 











Note:   No.1=U-36A(1992)*1.038A17 




1~   2 777,054 














Note:   No.1~2=T-5(1993)*1.038A17 
Others=No.n.038A(n-1) 
LC-90 
Note:   No.1=TC-90(1992)*1.038A18 
Others=No.1*1.038A(n-1) 
OH-6D 
1-   2 1,044,820 
3-   4 1,084,523 
TOTAL 4,258,687 
AVE. 1.064,672 
1-   2 446,830 
3 463,809 
4-   5 481,434 
6-   7 499.728 
8-   9 518.718 
TOTAL 4,357,229 
AVE. 484,137 




Note:   No.1=OH-6D(1992)*1.038A18 
Others=No.n.038A(n-1) 
VFA 


















Note:   No.1=92  C-130*1.038A18 
Others=No.n.038A(n-1) 
'92 C-130=4,468(Yen M) 
Sourse : Kaijojieitai Yosan Jimuteiy 
Note:  No.1-5=92  AV-8B(USA)*1.038A1I 
Others=No.1*1.038A(n-1) 
92  AV-6B=45($M) 
o (Kaijobakuryokanbu) 
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APPENDIX AI. ESTIMATE OF ESCALATION RATE 
Personnel & Provisions 
Year Real Budget UP RATE 
1985 258,862,767 - 
1986 277,127,377 0.071 
1987 295,288,330 0.066 
1988 304,585,547 0.031 
1989 297,1 14,087 -0.025 
199.0 296,648,554 -0.002 
1991 304,231,314 0.026 
1992 317,180,984 0.043 
1993 329,059,411 0.037 
AVE. 0.031 
Amunition 
Year Real Budget UP RATE 
1985 21,424,063 
1986 26,317,377 0.228 
1987 30,078,419 0.143 
1988 30,458,956 0.013 
1989 34,539,952 0.134 
1990 40,931,982 0.185 
1991 48,020,298 0.173 
1992 40,931,666 -0.148 
1993 41,097,536 0.004 
AVE. 0.092 
Others 
Year Real Budget UP RATE 
1985 196,008,477 
1986 193,014,398 -0.015 
1987 217,928,854 0.129 
1988 241.648,704 0.109 
1989 280,340,803 0.160 
1990 318.894,057 0.138 
1991 302,357,111 -0.052 
1992 342.626,207 0.133 
1993 331,655,062 -0.032 
AVE. 0.071 
Source : Kaijojieitai Yosan Jimteiyo (Kaijobakuryokanbu) 
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